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Abstract
Gender gaps in labor-market outcomes often emerge with the arrival of the first child.
We investigate a causal link between gender norms and labor-supply expectations within
a survey experiment among 2,000 German adolescents. Using a hypothetical scenario,
we document that the majority of girls expects to work 20 hours or less per week
when having a young child, and expects from their partner to work 30 hours or more.
Randomized treatments that highlight the existing traditional norm towards mothers
significantly reduce girls’ self-expected labor supply and thereby increase the expected
gender di erence in labor supply between their partners and themselves (the expected
within-family gender gap). Treatment e ects persist in a follow-up survey two weeks later,
and extend to incentivized outcomes. In a second experiment, we highlight another, more
gender-egalitarian, norm towards shared household responsibilities and show that this
attenuates the expected within-family gender gap. Our results suggest that social norms
play an important role in shaping gender gaps in labor-market outcomes around child birth.
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1 Introduction
The birth of the first child has large and persistent negative e ects on labor-market outcomes
of women, but not of men. This finding holds for di erent countries and over time (Angelov
et al., 2015; Kuziemko et al., 2018; Kleven et al., 2019b). Estimates of so-called child
penalties—the impact of children on earnings of women relative to men—range from 20–25
percent in Scandinavia to 30–40 percent in Anglo-Saxon countries, and 40–60 percent in
German-speaking countries (Kleven and Landais, 2017; Kleven et al., 2019a). In fact, the
arrival of children is one of the primary reasons for persistent gender inequalities on the labor
market (Kleven et al., 2019b). While the disadvantages in the labor market due to childbirth
for women compared to men are well documented, only little is known about the underlying
causes. In this paper, we argue that gender norms concerning parental labor supply can cause
gender di erences in outcomes relevant to the labor market.
From a theoretical perspective, such norms may encourage women and men to adjust their
labor-market choices to what seems socially appropriate for mothers and fathers to do and in
this way, produce gender gaps on the labor market (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2010;
Bertrand et al., 2015; Cortes and Pan, 2020). Indeed, empirical studies show that existing social
norms towards maternal labor supply correlate strongly with child penalties across countries
(Steinhauer, 2018; Kleven et al., 2019b). Yet, establishing a causal link between social norms
and labor-market outcomes is challenging because exogenous variations in norms are rare. We
therefore design and run large-scale online survey experiments to experimentally study the
e ects of social norms on labor-supply expectations.
Our sample consists of 2,000 German adolescents aged between 14 and 17 years. As
in many other developed countries, social norms concerning women in general are relatively
gender-equal in Germany, but those directly addressing how mothers should behave on the
labor market are still very traditional. We focus on adolescents as they already face important,
labor-market relevant decisions such as educational or occupational choices. These choices
may be a ected by labor-supply expectations even prior to labor-market entry. Moreover,
understanding the role of social norms is particularly relevant for adolescents, who are in a key
phase of gender-di erential socialization (e.g., Hill and Lynch, 1983; Priess et al., 2009) that
may lay the foundation for later gender inequalities.
We measure labor-supply expectations by presenting adolescents a hypothetical scenario,
in which we ask them to imagine themselves at the age of 30 having a child. We then ask
respondents about labor-supply expectations for themselves and for their hypothetical partner,
allowing us not only to investigate respondents’ self-expected labor supply, but also expected
labor-supply di erences between them and their partner (i.e., the within-family gender gap).
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The fact that most adolescents are not yet on the labor market allows us to study expected
labor-supply before any actual demand-side restrictions on the labor market are likely to become
relevant.1 We follow a long tradition in economics that studies subjective expectations and
preferences concerning the labor market and other domains (see e.g., Manski, 2004; Delavande,
2014; Wiswall and Zafar, 2018). To understand the role of gender norms in labor-market
decisions, preferences and expectations about future labor supply are an important and relevant
outcome to study because realized labor-market choices can be a result of many di erent
combinations of beliefs (e.g., about gender norms), preferences, and labor-market conditions.
By obtaining direct measures for expectations, we isolate the e ect of social norms on expected
future labor supply.
To experimentally investigate the causal link between gender norms and labor-supply
expectations, we first present an experiment that emphasizes the existing social norm prescribing
how much mothers and fathers of young children should work on the labor market.2 We
implement a novel experimental design to explicitly study the complementarity between the
norm’s salience and information about its exact content. In total, we therefore consider three
treatments that augment the norm’s salience, information, and both: The first treatment
salience asks respondents to guess the share of German adults who hold the opinion that
mothers and fathers, respectively, should reduce their labor-market supply while their children
are young. These belief-elicitation questions prime respondents to think of the gender roles
for mothers and fathers. The second treatment information informs respondents about a
representative study showing that 91 percent of Germans think that mothers should reduce
their labor supply while their children are young, and 41 percent think that fathers should
do so (Wippermann, 2015).3 The third treatment, salience and information, combines both
treatments by first posing the belief-elicitation question from treatment salience and afterwards
providing correct information about the social norm towards mothers and fathers from treatment
1In the hypothetical scenario, we explicitly ask respondents how many hours per week they would like to
work. This gives us a measure for the adolescents’ supply-side intentions that abstracts from respondents’
assumptions about the equilibrium mechanisms for the allocation of labor or preferences of the employees. We
refer to this measure as "labor-supply expectation" throughout the paper, but we do not mean to use this term
to imply that we have elicited probabilistic expectations or the like.
2We focus on injunctive, or prescriptive, social norms (i.e., what behavior is commonly approved of by
society), but not on descriptive social norms (i.e., what most members of society actually do) (e.g., Cialdini
and Trost, 1998; Benabou and Tirole, 2011). While injunctive social norms convey directly what an individual
ought to do in a certain situation, descriptive social norms also reflect factors outside of an individual’s control
(e.g., labor-demand constraints), which renders the interpretation of descriptive-norms e ects unclear (see
Goerges and Nosenzo (2020) for a recent discussion).
3Data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2012 confirms that traditional views concerning
maternal labor supply are not unique to Germany. In fact, in many developed countries—including more
gender-egalitarian Scandinavian countries—, most residents think that women with children under school age
should work at most part-time (see section 2.2 for details).
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information. After treatment, all respondents answer the same questions about their labor-
supply expectations as the untreated control group.
In the control group, we already find a large gender gap in self-expected labor supply: Most
girls (59 percent) expect to work 20 hours or less per week while most boys (70 percent)
expect to work 30 hours or more, which translates into a gender di erence of 7.3 work hours
per week. To study expected within-family gender gaps in parental labor supply, we exploit the
fact that we also elicited respondents’ labor-supply expectations for their partner. At baseline,
girls expect to work 7.7 hours less than their partner, and, conversely, boys expect to work 10.9
hours more than their partner. Moreover, adolescents hold biased beliefs on the content of the
existing gender norm (measured in treatments salience and salience and information): They
largely underestimate the share of German adults thinking that mothers should reduce their
labor supply (average belief: 66 percent; true value: 91 percent), and they also underestimate
the share thinking that fathers should do so (average belief: 35 percent; true value: 41 percent).
These misperceptions indicate leeway for correcting inaccurate beliefs through our information
treatments.
Among girls, all three treatments significantly reduce labor-supply expectations. Treatment
salience significantly reduces their self-expected labor supply by 2.0 hours per week. Treatment
information reduces labor-supply expectations by 2.6, and treatment salience and information
by 3.4 hours per week. We draw the following conclusions from this treatment-e ect pattern:
First, the strong e ects of treatment salience suggest that priming adolescents to think about
the existing gender norm already alters their labor-supply expectations. Second, the e ect of
the combined treatment salience and information is significantly larger (p<0.1) than the e ect
of treatment salience, suggesting that providing information about the norm’s content has an
additional e ect beyond the treatment salience. Third, the e ect of the combined treatment
salience and information is smaller than the sum of the two separate e ects of treatment
salience and treatment information, suggesting that part of the information e ect operates
through increasing the norm’s salience. Overall, reductions in self-expectations translate into
expected within-family gender gaps in labor supply that are more gender-unequal: On average,
the treatments induce girls to reduce their expectations about their own labor supply by
2.2 hours compared to their partners’ labor supply, thereby significantly increasing expected
within-family gender gaps.
Next, we investigate how the gender norm a ects boys, a question that—despite its
relevance—received much less attention in the public and scientific discourse than the e ects
on girls. Again, all three treatments reduce self-expected labor supply by 1.3 hours in treatment
salience, 1.6 hours in treatment information and 2.5 hours in treatment salience and information.
Contrary to the findings on girls, boys’ expectations for their own family become more gender-
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equal in response to the treatments:4 On average, the treatments cause boys to reduce their
labor-supply expectations by 1.4 hours more than those for their partner. This leads to a
reduction of their expected within-family gender gap.
Leveraging our follow-up survey about two weeks after the main survey, we investigate
whether information-treatment e ects persist beyond the immediate survey horizon.5 Focusing
on treatments information and salience and information, we find that the information treatments
persistently a ect both labor-supply expectations and beliefs about the content of the norm.
The persistence of treatment e ects suggests that they are not due to experimenter-demand
e ects (Haaland et al., 2020).
We then turn to analyzing the mechanisms underlying our treatment e ects. For this
purpose, we estimate heterogeneous information-treatment e ects by respondents’ prior beliefs
about the norm’s content within the sample of adolescents who received the prior belief
elicitation question (treatments salience and salience and information).6 The heterogeneity
analysis yields two findings: First, treatment e ects are already prevalent among respondents
with accurate priors, suggesting that information e ects are at least partly driven by salience-
based information updating (Bleemer and Zafar, 2018). Second, treatments e ects are larger in
absolute terms (albeit not significant at conventional levels) the more respondents underestimate
the content of the social norm, as would be expected for information-based updating.7
We subject our main findings to the following robustness checks: First, we address a
concern frequently expressed when it comes to unincentivized expectations measures, namely
that respondents do not have any monetary incentives to provide meaningful and honest
answers. To test whether treatment e ects carry over to outcomes with immediate monetary
consequences, we additionally elicited beliefs about the German public’s views on a set of
gender-related statements posed in the European Values Study, and pay respondents for correct
answers. Reassuringly, information provision strongly and significantly a ects these incentivized
outcomes, which shows that treatment e ects are not confined to survey answers without
direct monetary consequences. Second, since the traditional gender norm prescribes mothers’
and fathers’ labor supply, we would not necessarily expect the treatments to a ect labor-supply
4For both girls and boys, the norm treatments change self-expectations but hardly a ect the expectations
for their partner.
5Since priming e ects, like the once induced by treatment salience, are by definition short-term, we focus
our persistence analysis on treatments with informational content, which is standard in the information-provision
literature (e.g., Haaland et al., 2020).
6Information provision may impact individuals because it makes the importance of gender-norm issues for
labor-market participation more salient (e.g., Schwarz and Vaughn, 2002; Chetty et al., 2009; DellaVigna,
2009; Bleemer and Zafar, 2018), or because respondents were misinformed about the exact content of the
social norm and update their beliefs accordingly (e.g., Rocko  et al., 2012; Bursztyn et al., 2020).
7The interpretation of information-based updating is also consistent with the finding that respondents
who were informed about the exact content of the norm hold more accurate posterior beliefs about the share
agreeing to the respective norm statement in the follow-up survey.
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expectations without child. In fact, treatment e ects on labor-supply expectations without child
(elicited in an alternative hypothetical scenario) are small and insignificant, which mitigates
concerns that our main findings are due to unintended e ects such as experimenter-demand
e ects.
Finally, we investigate whether social norms can shift outcomes in both directions. We
therefore conduct a second experiment on a more egalitarian norm in the follow-up survey
and particularly study whether this norm could lead to less gender-unequal expectations. The
corresponding treatments experimentally highlight a more gender-egalitarian norm towards
sharing household responsibilities.8 In particular, the treatments leverage the fact that 89
percent of Germans think that men should take as much responsibility for the home and children
as women (European Values Study 2017). Adolescents hold downward-biased beliefs about
this share (average belief: 66 percent), and correcting these false beliefs through randomized
information provision significantly reduces expected within-family gender gaps in labor supply
after child birth by 1.3 hours per week among girls, and by 1.4 hours per week among boys.
To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to study the causal e ects of gender norms on
labor-supply expectations after child birth (see section 2.1 for a in-depth discussion on how
we contribute to the existing literature). Our findings suggest that social norms indeed play
an important role in shaping gender gaps in labor-market outcomes after child arrival. The
extent to which social norms shape labor-market outcomes may indeed depend on the degree
of egalitarianism in the underlying social prescription. Child penalties for mothers compared to
fathers may thus attenuate if norms towards mothers were to become more gender-equal over
time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we discuss how we
contribute to the existing literature, and provide background information on female labor-
market participation in Germany. Section 3 describes our dataset and the experimental design.
Section 4 provides descriptive evidence on adolescents’ labor-supply expectations. Section
5 shows the results of the first experiment that highlights social norms prescribing parental
labor supply, and presents several robustness tests. Section 6 presents results of our second
experiment on norms regarding shared household responsibilities. Section 7 concludes.
8While the traditional gender norm towards mothers’ and fathers’ labor supply after child birth studied in
the first experiment directly prescribes mothers’ and fathers’ labor supply, it is not the only gender norm that
might be relevant for labor-supply decisions. For instance, di erent norms prescribe relative income within
households (Bertrand et al., 2015), within-household division of work at home and on the labor market, or
educational decisions (European Values Study 2017).
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2 Background
In this section, we first discuss how our paper relates to, and extends, di erent strands of
the economic literature. Then, we provide institutional background information on female
labor-market participation and gender norms in Germany.
2.1 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to several strands of economic research. First, it adds to the growing
literature on child penalties that shows that gender gaps in labor-market outcomes often arise
with the birth of the first child (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2010; Angelov et al., 2015; Kleven
and Landais, 2017; Kuziemko et al., 2018; Kleven et al., 2019a,b). A small subset of this
literature studies potential underlying causes of child penalties, and argues that they are not
inherent in the biological relationship between mother and child (e.g., Andresen and Nix, 2019;
Kleven et al., 2020).9 Instead, factors related to socialization have been suggested as likely
explanations for why the arrival of children has stronger negative labor-market impacts on
women than men. Our paper works towards an understanding of whether strong social norms
prescribing mothers’ and fathers’ labor supply–one specific but important societal factor—can
explain gender gaps in parental labor supply.
Second, our paper contributes to a larger strand of literature that studies gender gaps
unrelated to parenthood. This literature argues that social norms may promote gender gaps in
the labor market (for a survey of this literature see Bertrand et al., 2010; Olivetti and Petrongolo,
2016; Blau and Kahn, 2017; Jayachandran, 2019; Altonji and Blank, n.d.). In particular, several
studies suggest that women’s labor-market outcomes have a cultural component, which is often
interpreted as indirect evidence of the importance of gender norms (e.g., Fernández et al.,
2004; Fernández, 2007; Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Alesina et al., 2013; Fernández, 2013;
Charles et al., 2018; Giuliano, 2018; Boelmann et al., 2020). In this respect, a few studies (e.g.,
Fortin, 2005; Giavazzi et al., 2013; Fortin, 2015) demonstrate direct cross-country correlations
between labor-market outcomes of women and injunctive gender norms measured in large-scale
surveys like the World Values Survey.10 To our knowledge, only two papers investigate such
correlations in the context of labor-market outcomes of parents (Steinhauer, 2018; Kleven
9Kleven et al. (2020) compare child penalties among biological and adoptive families and find that in both
types of families, men’s and women’s labor-market trajectories are very similar until the arrival of the first
child, and diverge with child arrival due to an abrupt and persistent negative shock on females’ labor-market
outcomes. Similarly, Andresen and Nix (2019) investigate child penalties among female same-sex couples
that include the biological mother of the child. They find no long-term di erences in labor-market outcomes
between the biological mother and the "co-mother".
10In this literature, commonly analyzed items usually focus on women’s role as caregiver vs. breadwinner
(e.g., agreement/disagreement to the statements "Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay." or
"When a wife earns more than her husband, it is almost certain to cause problems.").
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et al., 2019b). In contrast to these descriptive studies, our survey experiment allows us to
identify the direct and causal link between gender norms and expected labor-market outcomes.
In this sense, our paper is closest to the study by Bursztyn et al. (2020) which finds that
experimentally shifting perceived norms towards female labor-market participation in Saudi
Arabia increases the willingness of married men to let their wives join the labor force. While
Saudi Arabia provides an interesting case study for the role of gender norms in an extremely
gender-unequal setting, we test the causal link between social norms and labor-market outcomes
in Germany, a country with gender equality laws similar to those of most other developed
countries.11 Importantly, we focus on social norms and labor-market outcomes of mothers
rather than women in general, which is particularly important in the context of developed
countries: In these countries, overall gender gaps in labor-market outcomes have decreased over
time and are now relatively small (e.g., Blau and Kahn, 2017), but gender gaps among parents
are still large and persistent (Kleven et al., 2019b). Furthermore, our treatment addresses
the social norm towards both mothers and fathers, which extends the existing experimental
literature that has so far exclusively focused on gender norms relating to females’ labor supply.
Finally, we not only investigate how gender norms a ect decisions of girls regarding their own
and their partner’s labor supply as parents, but also of boys.
Third, our paper uses elements from the literature that leverages subjective expectation-data
to study decision-making under uncertainty (Manski, 2004). These studies often focus on
university students, and investigate expectations or preferences about family life, labor-market
relevant decisions such as educational choice or investment in children (e.g., Arcidiacono et al.,
2012; Cunha et al., 2013; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2013; Delavande and Zafar, 2019;
Wiswall and Zafar, 2019), and sometimes also gender di erences in expectations (e.g., Goldin
et al., 2006; Zafar, 2013; Reuben et al., 2017; Wiswall and Zafar, 2018). The rationale for using
expectations-data rather than realized outcomes is that observed choices can be consistent
with many di erent combinations of beliefs and preferences (Manski, 2004), which renders the
investigation of subjective beliefs and expectations highly relevant.
Finally, the fact that we leverage the norm’s salience to measure its e ects on labor-market
expectations is related to the literature that uses salience-treatments to prime subjects’ social
identities (e.g., Benjamin et al., 2010; Boschini et al., 2012) or increase salience of topics
like immigration (e.g., Alesina et al., 2018; Bleemer and Zafar, 2018; Aloud et al., 2020).
For example, Aloud et al. (2020) focus on female university students in Saudi Arabia and
investigate the e ects of (i) priming them to think about their parents and family, and (ii)
11Until mid–2019, Saudi Arabia had very strict "guardianship laws" that would not allow women any actions
related to work, leisure, health, finances, and law without the permission or company of a close male relative
(The Economist, July 20, 2019).
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informing them about their peers’ aspirations on labor-market expectations. They find that
both priming and information increase expected labor-force participation. In contrast to this
literature, our treatments directly address the injunctive social norm for parents’ work hours.
2.2 Institutional Background
Although Germany has a comparatively high female labor-market-participation rate of about 56
percent, it is still around 11 percentage points below the rate of males (OECD, 2017). Large
gender di erences do not only exist at this extensive margin, but also at the intensive margin:
Panel A of Appendix Figure A1 shows the share of male and female part-time employees across
countries. In Germany, 37 percent (9 percent) of all employed women (men) work part-time,
resulting in a gender gap in part-time employment of 28 percentage points, the largest in all
observed countries. Recent research suggests that the arrival of children is one of the primary
reasons for persistent gender inequalities on the labor market (Kleven et al., 2019a). Indeed,
Germany exhibits the largest long-run child penalty of 61 percent among all countries observed
(see panel B of Appendix Figure A1).
Appendix Figure A2 provides direct evidence for the existence of conservative injunctive
gender norms regarding the labor supply of mothers in di erent countries. The figure shows that
90 percent of Germans think that women with children under school age should work at most
part-time (International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2012). Comparing this share across
developed countries, it is striking that (i) the norm prescribes mothers to reduce their working
hours in all observed countries—including more gender-egalitarian Nordic countries—and (ii)
German gender norms are among the most traditional. Among the large set of existing gender
norms (e.g., prescribing the division of responsibility for the home and children, or relative
within-household income shares), our main experiment focuses on the norm that directly
prescribes parental labor supply, our main outcome.
Germany o ers a wide range of family-friendly policies intended to support female labor
supply. Since 2013, every child from the age of one has a legal claim for a public childcare
place. Childcare is heavily subsidized, which implies comparably low average costs for parents
of between 0 Euros and 400 Euros per month (Geis-Thoene, 2018). Parents are entitled to
12 months of paid parental leave after child birth, which can be extended to 14 months if
each parent takes at least 2 months of parental leave. Parents are also eligible for unpaid and
job-protected parental leave of up to 3 years for each child. Given this policy environment, our
main outcomes of interest are labor-market expectations when the child is between 1 year (i.e.,
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when the legal claim for a childcare place becomes e ective, and paid parental leave ends) and
6 years old (i.e., when compulsory schooling starts) (see section 3.2.1).12
3 Data and Experimental Design
In this section, we first describe the data-collection and sampling process, and then present the
experimental design, sample characteristics, and the empirical strategy.
3.1 Data Collection and Sample
Our online survey was conducted between October and December 2019 and covers a sample of
2,000 German adolescents aged between 14 and 17 years.13 The main survey comprises 11
questions related to educational, career, and labor-market decisions. In addition, we elicited a
rich set of sociodemographic characteristics at the end of the survey. Median completion time
was 12 minutes.
Sampling and polling were carried out by the German polling firm konkret Mafo (https:
//www.konkret-mafo.de/) who fielded the survey via online access panels.14 The recruitment
of adolescent respondents took place in two ways: First, adolescents who were registered in
the online panels were recruited directly (60 percent of our analytic sample). The remaining
40 percent were recruited indirectly via their parents who were registered in the online panels.
These parents were first asked for their permission to survey their child. If the parents agreed,
they received a survey link to be shared with their child.15 All respondents answered the
questionnaire autonomously on their own digital devices.
To test the persistence of treatment e ects, we implemented a follow-up survey about two
weeks after the main survey. The follow-up survey re-elicited some outcomes without repeating
any treatments from the main survey, and included the second experiment on the e ects of a
more gender-egalitarian norm towards the end (see section 3.2.2 for details).
12Childcare take-up after the child’s first birthday is 33 percent for one-year olds, and 66 percent for two-year
olds (Alt et al., 2017). Besides factors like childcare-slot shortages, social norms towards maternal labor supply
have been discussed as a potential reason for non-take up (e.g., Jessen et al., 2020).
13Our experimental setup is based on a short pilot experiment that the we conducted within the scope of
the ifo Education Survey 2018 (see Online Appendix O.1.1. for further details).
14Throughout the paper, we present unweighted analyses that assign equal weights to each respondent. It
is reassuring that re-weighting observations to match o cial statistics with respect to gender, age, sate of
residence and municipality size does not a ect our qualitative results (results available upon request). In the
context of adult samples, Grewenig et al. (2018) show that online surveys represent the overall population
(online and o ine) well.
15To ensure that the children and not their parents answered the survey, we incorporated several plausibility
checks of age and birth date. In case of failure to provide consistent answers, respondents were exited from





The main survey consists of three stages. In stage one, respondents were randomly assigned to
a control group or to one of three social-norm treatments (treatment salience, information or
salience and information). Stage two elicited labor-supply expectations, our main outcome of
interest. In stage three, we asked additional questions, e.g., incentivized outcome questions.16
Treatments: Before eliciting outcomes, respondents were randomly assigned to one of
four experimental groups with equal probability. One group is the untreated control group.
The other three groups receive di erent norm treatments that emphasize the existing social
norm related to parents’ labor supply. Unlike previous experimental studies, our treatments
emphasize the social prescriptions towards mothers and fathers, not only mothers.17
Treatment salience used a belief-elicitation question to prime respondents with gender-norm
considerations.18 Before stating the outcomes of interest, treated respondents were asked:
"What do you think, how many adults in Germany hold the opinion that mothers and fathers,
respectively, should reduce their labor supply while the children are young? We do not think of
the first months after child birth, but the time thereafter." Respondents were provided with
two open answer fields, one for mothers, and one for fathers (see panel A of Appendix Figure
A3 for a screenshot). This treatment was designed to make the social norm salient without
providing information about the norm’s content.
The second treatment information did not elicit beliefs, but instead provided respondents
with information about the share of German adults who hold the opinion that mothers and
fathers of young children should reduce their labor supply. We drew on results from a
representative study by the Federal Ministry for Family A airs, Senior Citizens, Women and
Youth fielded in 2015 (Wippermann, 2015): "Out of 100 adults in Germany, 91 hold the
opinion that the mother should reduce her labor supply while the children are young. At the
same time, out of 100 adults in Germany, 41 hold the opinion that the father should reduce
his labor supply while the children are young." Reassuringly, the norm concerning mothers’
labor supply in Germany collected by the ISSP in the year 2012 are practically identical to the
one of Wippermann (2015) that we use (see section 2.2), which indicates the robustness and
16Online Appendix O3 presents the question wordings.
17Our gender-bifocal treatment is in contrast to most of previous empirical studies on gender norms in the
sense that this literature often exclusively studies norms concerning women (e.g., Fernández and Fogli, 2009;
Alesina et al., 2013; Aloud et al., 2020; Bursztyn et al., 2020). To understand the wholistic impact of gender
norms on parental labor-market participation and associated gender gaps, we find it crucial to examine norms
that also prescribe the behavior of men.
18Other examples of studies that use belief-elicitation questions to increase salience are Alesina et al. (2018)
and Aloud et al. (2020).
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persistence of the norm. Along with the verbal statement, respondents were shown a graphical
illustration of the provided information (see panel B of Appendix Figure A3 for a screenshot).
The treatment salience and information combines both treatments: Respondents were first
asked the belief-elicitation questions as in treatment salience, and were then provided with the
factual information about the norm as in treatment information. This treatment allows us to
study the complementarity between salience and information provision.
Labor-supply expectations: Our main outcomes of interest are the respondents’ labor-
supply expectations that we elicited after treatment administration. In a hypothetical scenario,
respondents were asked to imagine being 30 years old, living with their partner and having a child
aged between 1 and 6 years. Our objective was to abstain as much as possible from adolescents’
assumptions about the equilibrium mechanisms for the allocation of labor, or preferences of the
employees to obtain a meaningful measure for the adolescents’ supply-side intentions. After
presenting the hypothetical scenario, we therefore elicit labor-supply expectations as follows:19
We then elicit labor-supply expectations as follows: "What do you think, how many hours per
week on average would you like to work in order to earn money?" and "And how many hours
per week on average would you like your partner to work in order to earn money?" Answers to
both questions were recorded on a 5-point scale ("0 hours, i.e. not at all"; "about 10 hours";
"about 20 hours"; "about 30 hours"; "about 40 hours, i.e. full-time").
For our main analyses, we combine responses to these two expectations questions to
analyze the following two outcomes: (a) self-expected labor supply with child; and (b) the
expected within-family gender gap in labor supply with child, calculated as the di erence
in (i) expectations regarding the male family member’s labor supply (i.e., male respondents’
self-expectations, and female respondents’ expectations regarding their partner), and (ii)
expectations regarding the female family member’s labor supply (i.e., female respondents’
self-expectations, and male respondents’ expectations regarding their partner).20
Since expectations play an important role in any decision under uncertainty, we believe
that our main outcomes of interest are well suited to study the impact of gender norms on
labor market-relevant behavior. By obtaining direct measures for labor-market expectations, we
can isolate the causal e ect of gender norms on adolescents’ future labor-supply expectations.
Reassuringly, several studies show that (labor-market) expectations strongly predict actual
19Note that it is common in the literature to study expectation for events that occur several years in the
future as we do (e.g., Goldin, 2014; Reuben et al., 2017; Wiswall and Zafar, 2018).
20In order to avoid implying mixed-sex relationships, we do not refer to the gender of partners when asking
about expectations regarding labor supply. Nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity and readability, we refer to
partners of female respondents as "male" or "father" and partners of male respondents as "female" or "mothers"
throughout the paper. If anything, we expect this slight inaccuracy to cause a downward bias in the observed
within-family gender gaps.
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(labor-market) realizations several years later (e.g., Wiswall and Zafar, 2018, 2019; Kunz and
Staub, 2020).
3.2.2 Follow-up Survey
We invited all respondents to participate in the follow-up survey two weeks after the main survey
to (i) investigate the persistence of treatment e ects, and (ii) implement a second experiment
focusing on a more gender-egalitarian norm related to sharing household responsibility. Between
14 and 35 days after the main survey (median time lag: 17 days), we re-surveyed 1,319
respondents (66 percent of the sample).21 Below, we introduce the individual stages of the
follow-up survey:
Persistence of treatment e ects: To study persistent treatment e ects on labor-supply
expectations, we first re-elicited labor-supply expectations as in the main survey. We then
asked all respondents the belief-elicitation questions from the treatment salience (see section
3.2.1) to assess whether the treatments led to persistent changes in respondents’ beliefs about
existing norms regarding the labor supply of mothers and fathers with young children.
Treatments: Thereafter, we implemented our second experiment to test the impact of
a di erent, more gender-egalitarian norm on labor-supply expectations. For this purpose,
respondents were randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups—a control and two
treatment groups. Randomization in the second experiment was independent from treatment
conditions in the first experiment. As pre-specified, we aimed to randomly allocated respondents
to the control group with 50 percent probability and to each treatment group with 25 percent
probability.22
The first treatment egalitarian information provides the following information: "Out of 100
adults in Germany, 89 hold the opinion that men should take as much responsibility for the
home and the children as women." (European Values Study 2017). As in the main survey
experiment, we provided a graphical illustration alongside the verbal statement (see Appendix
Figure A4 for screenshots).
21Re-contact rate and time lag between main survey and follow-up are at the upper end of other recent
studies featuring large-scale survey data from adult samples: Kuziemko et al. (2015), Haaland and Roth
(forthcoming), Alesina et al. (2018), and Lergetporer et al. (2020) have re-contact rates of 14 percent, 66
percent, 24 percent, and 64 percent, and time lags of one month, one week, one week, and two weeks
respectively.
22We chose these probabilities to maximize statistical power in regressions where we pool both treatment
groups. Due to a programming error in the follow-up survey, group sizes turned out to be 28, 20 and 52
percent for treatment egalitarian information, treatment salience and egalitarian information, and the control
group, respectively. Reassuringly, sociodemographic characteristics are well balanced across the experimental
groups (see Appendix Table A4 for details).
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The second treatment group salience and egalitarian information received the same infor-
mation, but had to guess the share of Germans holding that opinion beforehand (similar to
treatment salience and information in the main experiment).
The control group received no additional questions or information. We re-elicited ex-
pectations in the same manner as in the beginning of the follow-up survey and in the main
survey.
By focusing on a more gender-egalitarian norm towards sharing household responsibility in
the second experiment as compared to the traditional norm concerning parental labor supply
used in the first experiment, we take advantage of the coexistence of di erent gender norms
related to labor market behavior. The gender norms that we investigate in both experiments
vary along several key dimensions: First, the egalitarian norm focuses on responsibility for tasks
performed at the home (that are only indirectly related to our main outcome of interest—
labor-supply expectations), while the traditional norm focuses on labor supply. Second, the
egalitarian norm targets women and men more generally, while the traditional norm explicitly
focuses on parents. Finally, the traditional norm entails specific recommendations for behavior
(i.e., reducing labor supply), whereas the egalitarian norm refers to the vaguer concept of equal
responsibility.
Debriefing: At the end of the survey, we showed a debriefing screen that (i) informed about
the research question of the study (i.e., how gender norms a ect labor-supply expectations),
(ii) provided the content and data sources of both social-norm information treatments, and
(iii) provided correct answers to the additional belief-elicitation questions that we posed during
the survey (see section 5.3.1). Furthermore, to counteract that the treatments made gender
norms salient, the debriefing also stressed that decisions regarding future work hours depend
on many di erent important factors, and not only on social norms.
3.3 Sample Characteristics
Our analytic sample closely resembles the German population aged 14 to 17 years. Appendix
Table A1 compares the characteristics of our sample to the respective population statistics in
the German Microcensus.23 Reassuringly, in most categories our respondents’ characteristics
match o cial statistics well. While there are slight di erences between both samples with
respect to gender, educational track, and maternal employment, our sample covers a broad
and diverse spectrum of adolescents in Germany.
Appendix Table A2 presents balancing tests to check whether the randomization successfully
balanced respondents’ observable characteristics across the experimental groups in the main
23Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical O ce and the statistical o ces of the Laender, Micro-
census, census year 2015.
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survey. The first column presents the average characteristics of the control group, and the
subsequent columns present characteristics of treatment groups salience, information, and
salience and information along with the respective di erences to the control group. Reassuringly,
only one out of 69 pairwise comparisons is significant at the 5-percent level, and four at the
10-percent level, as would be expected by pure chance. Thus, random assignment worked as
intended.
Appendix Table A3 investigates whether participation in the follow-up survey is related
to treatment assignment in the first experiment that was implemented in the main survey.
Regressing a dummy for follow-up-survey participation on treatment indicators and covariates
shows insignificant coe cients on treatments salience and information, and only a marginally
significant coe cient on treatment salience and information. Furthermore, males, younger
respondents, those living in large cities, and those without a degree are more likely to participate
in the follow-up survey. Importantly, among those who participated in the follow-up survey,
covariates are well-balanced across treatments of the first experiment (see Appendix Table A4),
implying that treatment-e ect estimates of the first experiment on outcomes measured in the
follow-up survey are unbiased. Finally, Appendix Table A5 confirms that the randomization in
the second experiment implemented in the follow-up survey was also successful in balancing
respondents’ characteristics across experimental groups.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
We estimate the causal e ects of the social-norm treatments using the following regression
model:
yi = a0 +Â
j
a1 jT ji + d
0
Xi + ei, with j 2 {S, I,S&I} (1)
where yi is the outcome variable of interest, and T Si , T Ii , T S&Ii are treatment indicators equal
to 1 if respondent i received treatment salience, information, or salience and information, and
0 otherwise. Xi is a vector of control variables, and ei is the error term. Average treatment
e ects a1S, a1I, and a1S&I are identified because of random assignment. In some selected
analyses, we pool treatments to facilitate exposition.
To analyze whether treatment e ects are heterogeneous across gender, we extend our basic
regression model to:
yi = b0 +Â
j
b1 jT ji +Â
j
b2 jT ji ⇤ f emalei +b3 f emalei + d
0
Xi + ei, with j 2 {S, I,S&I} (2)
The treatment e ect for boys is given by b1, and b2 gives the additional e ect for girls.
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Since we elicited labor-supply expectations from each respondent twice in the follow-up
survey (once at the very beginning to assess treatment-e ect persistence of the first experiment,
and again after the second experiment), we can estimate treatment e ects on stacked data and
include individual fixed e ects to increase statistical precision. In the corresponding analysis,
we therefore estimate the following regression model:
yit = a0 +Â
j
a1 jT jit + µi + eit , with j 2 {EI,S&EI} (3)
where yit is the outcome variable of interest of respondent i at time t (before or after eventual
treatment administration), and T EIit , T S&EIit are indicators for treatment egalitarian information
and salience and egalitarian information, respectively. µi are individual fixed e ects and eit is
the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Finally, to deal with the potential issue of multiple-hypothesis testing, our regression tables
further present adjusted p-values following the procedure by List et al. (2019). We adjust for
multiple treatments, multiple subgroups (girls and boys) and—where applicable—for multiple
outcomes.
4 Descriptive Results: Labor-Supply Expectations
We start by describing labor-supply expectations in the control group and discuss how they
relate to respondents’ characteristics.
Figure 1 depicts self-expected labor supply of girls and boys in the control group. The
gender di erence in expected work hours is large: While the majority of girls (59 percent)
expect to work 20 hours or less (panel A), the majority of boys (80 percent) expect to work 30
hours or more (panel B). This di erence corresponds to a gender gap of 7.3 work hours per
week (23.8 versus 31.1 hours). Furthermore, expectations are consistent with gender gaps in
actual labor supply: In the German Microcensus (2015), 17 percent of mothers with children
aged between 1 and 6 years work full-time, while 46 percent work part-time, and 38 percent do
not work at all. On the contrary, most fathers (87 percent) work full-time, and only 7 percent
do not work at all.
The fact that expected gender gaps in labor supply are large is also reflected in our second
outcome variable of interest: The average expected within-family gender gap in labor supply is
9.1 work hours per week.
Figure 2 shows how the two measures of labor-supply expectations vary across di erent
sociodemographic subgroups, and Table A6 presents the corresponding bivariate regressions.
Respondents’ gender matters beyond self-expected labor supply, since girls expect a significantly
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smaller within-family gender gap than males (see panel B of Figure 1). East German respondents
expect to work longer hours than West German respondents (panel A), and they expect a
smaller within-family gender gap (panel B). These findings reflect the well-documented fact
that labor-force participation of women and mothers is traditionally higher in East Germany
than in West Germany (e.g., Boelmann et al., 2020). Finally, respondents whose mothers
currently work full-time expect smaller within-family gaps, which is in line with the literature
on intergenerational transmission of gender norms (e.g., Fernández et al., 2004).
5 E ects of the Norm Prescribing Parental Labor Supply
In this section, we first describe baseline beliefs about the existing traditional gender norm
concerning parental labor supply in Germany. Next, we present the e ects of the norm
treatments on labor-supply expectations. Finally, we show treatment e ects on additional
outcomes that are not directly targeted by the norm.
5.1 Beliefs about the Norm
Figure 3 depicts respondents’ prior beliefs about the share of German adults who hold the
opinion that mothers and fathers, respectively, should reduce their labor supply while their
children are young—elicited in the treatments salience and salience and information. On
average, respondents believe that 66 percent of Germans think that mothers should reduce
their labor supply, and the median belief is 70 percent (true value: 91 percent). Thus, most
adolescents underestimate the actual share of Germans holding this opinion (see panel A). The
same pattern applies to the social norm concerning fathers (see panel B): The mean (median)
belief is that 35 (31) percent of Germans think that fathers should reduce their labor supply
(true value: 41 percent). Interestingly, prior beliefs do not di er systematically by respondents’
gender: Girls’ mean (median) belief about the norm towards mothers is 66 percent (70 percent),
and it is 35 percent (35 percent) towards fathers. The respective figures for boys are 65 percent
(70 percent) and 35 percent (30 percent).
In a nutshell, respondents underestimate the di erence between the social norms with
respect to mothers and fathers. The stark misperceptions of the prevailing social norm regarding
labor supply of mothers and fathers indicate potential leeway for correcting these beliefs through
information provision in treatments information and salience and information. In the next
section, we study norm-treatment e ects on expected labor supply.
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5.2 Treatment E ects on Labor-Supply Expectations
Since the gender norm regarding parental labor supply prescribes di erent labor-market behavior
for mothers and fathers, we present treatment-e ect estimates separately for girls and for boys.
5.2.1 Girls’ Labor-Supply Expectations
The left part of Figure 4 displays self-expected labor supply in the control group and in the
pooled treatment groups for girls. The treatments significantly reduce self-expected labor
supply: The share of girls expecting to work 20 hours or less per week increases significantly
from 59 percent to 67 percent (see panel A), and, conversely, the share expecting to work 30
hours or more significantly decreases from 41 percent to 33 percent (see panel B).
Turning to regression results, panel A of Table 1 shows that the pooled treatment e ects
correspond to a significant reduction of 2.6 hours in expected weekly work hours of girls (see
column 1).24 In Table 2 we present the e ects of the three treatments separately. Each
treatment has a highly significant and negative impact on girls’ self-expected labor supply. The
e ect of the combined treatment salience and information is significantly (p<0.1) larger than
the e ect of treatment salience, and the e ect size of treatment information is in-between
the two. This pattern leads to three important insights: First, the strong e ects of treatment
salience suggests that priming adolescents to think about the existing gender norm already alters
their labor-supply expectations. Second, the significant di erence between treatment salience
and the combined treatment salience and information suggests that providing information about
the norm’s content has an additional e ect beyond the treatment salience. Third, the e ect of
treatment salience and information is smaller than the sum of the e ects of treatment salience
and treatment information, suggesting that information provision partly a ects adolescents’
expectations by making the norm salient. We discuss the role of the norms’ salience in more
detail in section 5.2.4.
Column 2 of Table 1 presents the pooled treatment e ects on the expected within-family
gender gap in labor supply, i.e., respondents’ expected work hours of the male family member
minus that of the female family member. The social-norm treatments significantly increase
girls’ expected within-family gender gap from 7.7 weekly work hours by 2.2 hours. Each
treatment has a separate highly significant and positive impact on the expected within-family
gender gap (see Table 2) which can be explained by the fact the treatments primarily decrease
24Online Appendix Table O1 presents treatment e ects separately on each of the five answer categories.
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self-expectations, but not their expectations for the partner (see Online Appendix Table O1 for
separate treatment e ects on labor-supply expectations for the partner).25
To deal with the potential issue of multiple-hypothesis testing, the main tables additionally
display adjusted p-values following the methodology of List et al. (2019). We find that levels
of significance do not change substantially when adjusting for multiple subgroups (Table 1) or
multiple subgroups as well as multiple treatments (Table 2).
In sum, girls’ labor-supply expectations react strongly to treatments that highlight the
traditional social norm on of how much mothers of young children should work on the labor
market. Girls’ expectations become more gender-unequal in the sense that they expect to work
fewer hours themselves and expect a larger within-family gender gap in labor-market hours.
Thus, our results indicate that gender norms play an important role in explaining gender gaps
in labor-market outcomes after child birth.
5.2.2 Boys’ Labor-Supply Expectations
Next, we investigate how the gender norm a ects expected labor supply of boys. The right
part of Figure 4 reveals that the pooled social norm treatments also reduce self-expected labor
supply for boys: The share of boys expecting to work at most 20 hours per week significantly
increases from 20 percent to 28 percent in response to the treatments (see panel A). At the
same time, the share of boys expecting to work 30 hours or more significantly decreases from
80 percent to 72 percent (see panel B), which is entirely driven by a decrease in the share of
boys expecting to work 40 hours.
Panel B of Table 1 show that these treatment e ects correspond to a significant reduction
of 1.8 expected weekly work hours (column 1).26 Table 2 depicts treatment e ects separately
for each of the three norm treatments. In line with the results for girls, each of the three
treatments has a negative impact on boys’ self-expected labor supply (see column 1 of Table
2). The e ect of the combined treatment salience and information is the largest one and highly
significant (p<0.01), the coe cient on treatment-indicator information is marginally significant
(p<0.1), and the coe cient on treatment salience does not reach statistical significance.
Columns 2 of Table 1 and Table 2 present treatment e ects on the expected within-family
gender gap in labor supply. In contrast to our findings for girls, boys’ expectations for their
own family tend to become more gender-equal when being confronted with the existing social
norm. The treatments decrease (albeit not significantly so) boys’ expected within-family gender
gap from 11 weekly work hours by 1.4 hours, which is again due to the fact the treatments
25In line with the fact that we hardly find treatment e ects on partners’ labor-supply expectations, we do
not find any treatment e ects on girls’ preferences for a set of partner attributes, either (e.g., whether the
partner helps with the household or raising children etc.) (results available upon request).
26Online Appendix Table O2 presents treatment e ects separately for each of the five answer categories.
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decrease self-expectations, but do not a ect expectations for the partner (see Online Appendix
Table O2).27
Overall, we find that the gender norm prescribing mothers’ and fathers’ labor supply
strongly impact adolescents’ expectations of their own labor supply. While the norm makes
girls’ expectations more gender-unequal, boys’ expectations become more gender-equal. This
latter result is particularly noteworthy given that the question how gender norms a ect boys’
labor supply has not yet been studied in the literature.
5.2.3 Persistence of Treatment
Next, we check whether treatment e ects persist beyond the immediate survey horizon into the
follow-up survey conducted about two weeks later. Given that priming e ects, such as the ones
induced by treatment salience, are by definition temporary and short-term (e.g., Forehand et al.,
2002; Benjamin et al., 2010), we only expect persistent e ects from treatments that entail
information provision. Therefore, our persistence-analysis compares the pooled experimental
groups that received and did not receive information on the norm’s content (i.e., treatments
information and salience and information versus treatment salience and the control group).
As the previous section shows that the treatments do not a ect respondents’ labor supply
expectations for their partner, we restrict our analyses of persistence on self-expected labor
supply.
Table 3 combines data from the main survey and the follow-up survey and regresses
self-expected labor supply on an information-treatment dummy, a follow-up-survey dummy, and
the interaction of both indicators. For the overall sample, column 1 shows that information-
treatment e ects persist in the follow-up survey. As expected, the treatment e ect in the
follow-up survey tends to be somewhat smaller than the one in the main survey (likely due
to imperfect recall), although the di erence between treatment e ects is not statistically
significant (see coe cient on the interaction term). Columns 2 and 3 report persistent
treatment e ects separately for girls and boys. While treatment e ects in the follow-up survey
for these subsamples are remarkably similar in magnitude to the full sample, they do not reach
statistical significance due to limited statistical power.28
27In addition, Appendix Table A7 depicts treatment-e ect heterogeneities by gender on both labor-supply
expectations. Column 1 confirms that the treatments equally a ect self-expected labor supply among girls and
boys. Column 2 shows treatment e ect heterogeneities on the expected within-family gender gap, where we
observe di erences by gender for all treatments. While girls become more gender-unequal in their expectations
for their own family, boys seem to become more gender-equal by expecting a smaller within-family gender gap. In
online appendix table O3 we also present e ect heterogeneities with respect to various other sociodemographic
characteristics.
28In further analyses, we exploit variation in the time lag between main and follow-up survey, and find that
treatment-e ect persistence does not significantly di er for respondents who participated earlier vs. later in the
follow-up (results available upon request). Appendix Table A8 analyses persistence for all three treatments
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Turning to belief-updating, Appendix Table A9 investigates respondents’ stated beliefs
relative to accurate values. It shows that information provision persistently improves beliefs
about the content of the norm, i.e., the share of Germans who hold the opinion that mothers
and fathers, respectively, should reduce their labor supply. Interestingly, respondents seem to
internalize in particular the existing norm for their own gender, which is consistent with the
fact that the norm treatments mainly a ect self-expected labor supply.29
In sum, the information treatments in the main survey lead to a persistent updating of
self-expected labor supply and beliefs in the follow-up survey, which implies that (i) adolescents
indeed understand and remember the provided information, and (ii) treatment e ects are
unlikely due to experimenter-demand e ects (e.g., Cavallo et al., 2017; Bleemer and Zafar,
2018; Haaland et al., 2020).30
5.2.4 Heterogeneities by Prior Beliefs
The literature discusses two potential channels through which information provision may a ect
individuals’ responses: salience-based versus information-based updating (Bleemer and Zafar,
2018). In our setting, information treatments may a ect labor-supply expectations because
information provision increases the salience of the gender norms (e.g., Schwarz and Vaughn,
2002; Chetty et al., 2009; DellaVigna, 2009; Bleemer and Zafar, 2018), or because it corrects
respondents’ misperceptions about the content of the norm (e.g., Rocko  et al., 2012; Bursztyn
et al., 2020).31 To investigate the relevance of these channels, we estimate heterogeneous
information-treatment e ects by respondents’ prior beliefs (elicited in treatments salience and
salience and information) using the following regression model:
yi = g0 + g1T S&Ii + g2T S&Ii ⇤Misperceptioni + g3Misperceptioni + d
0
Xi + ei (4)
where Misperceptioni is the di erence between the factual share of Germans thinking that
respondent i’s gender (i.e., mothers or fathers) should reduce his or her labor supply minus
separately. While statistical power is again limited, results suggest the e ect of treatment salience does not
persist, while the e ects of treatments involving information provision have the expected sign and are partly
significant.
29Appendix Figure A5 presents the entire distribution of beliefs.
30Quidt et al. (2018) and Mummolo and Peterson (2019) show that (survey) experiments are largely robust
to experimenter-demand e ects.
31The idea behind salience-based updating is that information about one specific norm increases the
salience of that specific norm relative to other aspects that may a ect labor-supply expectations. Labor-supply
expectations could generally be influenced by a multitude of social-norm considerations, because (i) social
identity is multidimensional (for instance, it can refer to gender, race, or social status (Akerlof and Kranton,
2000) and (ii) several social norms may coexist within each domain of social identity. In the context of gender
norms, such norms may prescribe labor supply, relative income within households (Bertrand et al., 2015), or
shared household responsibility, for instance.
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respondent i’s belief about this share. The coe cient g1 captures the average information e ect
for respondents with correct prior beliefs, and g2 captures the additional e ect for respondents
who initially misperceive the social norm. Information-based updating would imply that g2 is
significant and negative, whereas salience-based updating would imply that g2 is close to zero.
Table 4 shows that the coe cients on the treatment salience and information are negative
and, in the full sample, significantly di erent from zero. In addition, coe cients on the
interaction term are negative as to be expected for information-based updating (but shy of
statistical significance).32
Our results on the treatment e ects for respondents with accurate priors suggest that provid-
ing information about the social norm’s content at least partly a ects labor-supply expectations
by increasing the norm’s salience. This interpretation is in line with the previous literature:
Bleemer and Zafar (2018) find that the e ects of college-returns information on intended
college attendance do not vary by respondents’ prior beliefs about college returns. Similarly,
Alesina et al. (2018) argue that salience e ects drive their negative findings of correcting
natives’ over-pessimistic beliefs about immigrants on natives’ preferences for redistribution.33
5.3 Treatment E ects on Additional Outcomes
5.3.1 Incentivized Outcomes
A common critique against the expectations-literature is that the main outcomes of interest—
survey-based expectations about future events or actions—have no immediate consequences
for respondents, which raises concerns about the outcome variables’ relevance.
To test whether treatment e ects carry over to outcomes with direct monetary consequences,
we next present results from a set of incentivized belief-questions that asked respondents to
guess the shares of Germans who agree with the following gender-related statements (European
Values Study 2017): (i) "A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl."
(EVS: 16 percent); (ii) "When the mother works for pay, the children su er." (EVS: 33 percent);
(iii) "Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay." (EVS: 55 percent); and (iv)
"If a woman earns more than her husband, it’s almost certain to cause problems." (EVS: 20
percent). We introduce immediate monetary consequences for correct answers by paying each
respondent two additional Euros for a roughly correct answer (defined as belonging to the
better half of guesses) to the randomly chosen question. This experimental design allows us to
test whether treatment e ects carry over to outcomes with immediate monetary consequences.
32In line with the interpretation of information-based-updating, we also find significant treatment e ects of
the treatments that provide accurate information on beliefs elicited in the follow-up survey (see section 5.2.3).
33In Online Appendix O1, we study perceived peer pressure as a further potential mechanism driving our
treatment e ects, and find that the channel seems to be relevant for girls but not for boys.
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Figure 5 provides a graphical depiction of the belief distributions for each item across exper-
imental groups with and without information provision, and Table 5 reports the corresponding
regression results.34 Information provision significantly a ects respondents’ incentivized beliefs
about the share of Germans agreeing to the di erent items. This finding, along with the fact
that previous research has shown that unincentivized expectations are tightly linked to real
outcomes, gives rise to our interpretation that treatment e ects reflect e ects of the gender
norm on (labor-market) relevant outcomes.35
5.3.2 Labor-Supply Expectations Without Child
The traditional gender norm that we study prescribes labor supply of mothers and fathers.
Consequently, the norm treatments should a ect labor-supply expectations with child, but not
necessarily without child. To perform this additional sanity check, we also elicited respondents’
expected labor supply at the age of 30 in a hypothetical scenario without child.
Appendix Table A11 shows pooled treatment e ects on labor-supply expectations without
children. Treatment e ects on both self-expected labor supply and the expected within-family
gender gap are small and insignificant for both genders. The fact treatment e ects are confined
to those outcomes that are directly prescribed by the norm further raises confidence that our
experimental results reflect genuine e ects of the specific norm, as opposed to some unintended
e ects such as experimenter-demand e ects.36
6 E ects of the Norm on Shared Household
Responsibility
So far, we have shown that the prevailing traditional social norm prescribing mothers’ and
fathers’ labor supply decreases labor-supply expectations, and thereby potentially promoting
gender gaps in labor-market outcomes. We now investigate whether social norms can shift
labor-market relevant outcomes in both directions. We therefore conduct a second experiment in
34We expect only the information content of treatments information as well as information and salience
to spill over to the gender-related items as the incentivized outcome questions per se already induces all
respondents to think about societal expectations and hence increase salience of the respective issues (similar to
the questions posed in treatment salience). We therefore pool the two treatments information and salience
and information and compare them to treatments salience and the control group. Appendix Table A10 reports
e ects of each treatment separately, and confirms that only those treatments that entail information provision
a ect the incentivized outcomes.
35Interestingly, respondents in the treatment group report more conservative beliefs, which undermines the
accuracy of beliefs in all items but item (iii). In view of this result, it is particularly important to note that we
provided accurate information about the di erent items in the debriefing stage at the very end of the survey.
36In Online Appendix O1, we study preferences for job attributes as additional indirect outcome variables,
and find little evidence that these preferences are a ected by the norm-treatments.
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the follow-up survey to study whether a more egalitarian norm could lead to less gender-unequal
outcomes. The corresponding treatments highlight a more gender-egalitarian norm towards
sharing household responsibilities. In this section, we first describe baseline beliefs about the
norm, and then present treatment e ects on labor-supply expectations.
6.1 Beliefs about the Norm
Figure 6 depicts prior beliefs about the egalitarian gender norm elicited in treatment salience
and egalitarian information. It shows that respondents underestimate the egalitarianism of the
norm: The mean (median) guess is that 59 percent (60 percent) of Germans think that men
should take as much responsibility for the household as women, whereas the true share in the
German population is 89 percent. While both genders misperceive this norm, girls’ beliefs tend
to be more accurate than boys’ beliefs (60 percent versus 55 percent median guess).
6.2 Treatment e ects on Labor-Supply Expectations
Table 6 depicts pooled e ects of treatments egalitarian information and salience and egalitarian
information on labor-supply expectations. Focusing on the expected within-family gender gap
in labor supply as the outcome of interest,37 we indeed find that the treatments attenuates the
expected gender gap in labor supply. In particular, the pooled treatments significantly decrease
the expected gap by 1.3 hours per week (column 1). Girls expect a reduction of the gender gap
by 1.3 hours (column 2), and boys by 1.4 hours (column 3). Appendix Table A12 shows that
both treatments have statistically significant negative e ects on the expected within-family
gender gap. If anything, treatment e ects tend to be stronger in the combined treatment
salience and egalitarian information than in treatment egalitarian information, which resembles
the patterns in the first experiment (see section 5).
In sum, these results show that the more egalitarian gender norm towards sharing household
responsibility can lead to more gender-equal expectations regarding the within-family gender
gap in labor supply after child birth. In the treatment groups both genders expect the mother
to reduce her labor supply less relative to the father. Thus, the e ects of gender norms on labor-
market expectations can depend on the specific context—and the degree of gender-equality—of
the respective norm.
37We focus on the expected within-family gap outcome of interest because this social norm explicitly
addresses the household as a whole. Further analyses indeed reveal that treatment e ects on the within-family




In many developed countries, gender di erences in labor-market outcomes do not emerge until
the arrival of the first child. We shed light on the causal relationship between labor-market
outcomes and gender norms in large-scale experiments among 2,000 adolescents in Germany, a
country with comparatively large child penalties in addition to a very traditional norm on how
much mothers should work on the labor market. At baseline, most girls (59 percent) expect to
work no more than 20 hours per week with a young child, and most boys (80 percent) expect
to work at least 30 hours per week. Administering treatments that highlight the existence of a
traditional gender norm in Germany—i.e., that 91 percent (41 percent) of Germans think that
mothers (fathers) of young children should reduce labor supply—significantly reduces girls’
labor-supply expectations by 2.6 hours per week, which increases the expected within-family
gender gap in labor supply. While largely neglected by the literature so far, we also study how
the gender norm a ects boys’ labor-supply expectations. Boys also expect to reduce their
labor supply in response to the norm treatments, which translates into a reduced expected
within-family gender gap. Finally, we show that an alternative treatment highlighting a more
gender-egalitarian norm towards sharing household responsibility results in more gender-equal
labor-supply expectations among both genders.
Our results indicate that social norms play an important role in shaping gender gaps in
labor-market outcomes with young children.
While we discuss that e ects of gender norms may indeed depend on the degree of
egalitarianism in the underlying social prescription, the question whether and how social norms
towards parents may change is beyond the scope of this study. Previous research has argued
that the introduction of the birth control pill (Goldin and Katz, 2002), technological change
(Alesina et al., 2013) or the implementation of parental leave reforms (Dahl et al., 2014)
have changed societal views on gender issues over time. Accordingly, if social norms towards
mothers were to become more egalitarian, child penalties for mothers compared to fathers may
attenuate given our findings.
However, we view our results as "proof of concept" that norms regarding parental labor
supply causally a ect labor-market relevant outcomes in a country with gender-equal laws that
resemble those in most other developed countries. We believe that expanding the scale and
looking at how norms a ect a broader set of outcomes, such as labor-market institutions, child
care supply or employer behavior is an interesting avenue for future research.
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Figure 1: Labor-Supply Expectations
Panel A: Expectations to Work at Most 20 Hours per Week
Panel B: Expectations to Work at Least 30 Hours per Week
Notes: Responses to the question "Imagine you are 30 years old and you have a child aged between 1 and 6 years with your partner. What
do you think, how many hours per week on average would you like to work in order to earn money?". Sample: Respondents in the control
group.
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Figure 2: Labor-Supply Expectations across Sociodemographic Characteristics
Panel A: Self-Expected Labor Supply
Panel B: Expected Within-Family Gender Gap
Notes: The figure shows the control group answers to the expected labor supply for di erent groups of respondents. The shaded areas are
95 percent confidence intervals around the average response. Panel A: Hours expected to work per week with child 1-6 (0=0 hours, i.e.
not at all; 10= 10 hours; 20= 20 hours, i.e. part-time; 30=30 hours, 40=40 hours, i.e. full-time). Panel B: Responses to labor supply for
both parents (self and partner) with higher values indicating higher labor market supply of men relative to women. Average hours (full
sample) indicated by vertical, dotted line.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Beliefs about the Norm Prescribing Parental Labor Supply
Panel A: Norm that Mothers Should Reduce Their Labor-Supply when Children Are Young
Panel B: Norm that Fathers Should Reduce Their Labor-Supply when Children Are Young
Notes: Beliefs about the extent of the norm that parents should reduce their labor market supply when children are young. Correct values
indicated by vertical lines. Sample: Respondents in experimental groups salience or salience and information.
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Figure 4: Self-expected Labor Supply across Treatments
Panel A: Expectations to Work at Most 20 Hours per Week
Panel B: Expectations to Work at Least 30 Hours per Week
Notes: Responses to the question "Imagine you are 30 years old and you have a child aged between 1 and 6 years with your partner. What
do you think, how many hours per week on average would you like to work in order to earn money?" Treatm. (pooled): Respondent in
experimental groups salience, information or salience and information. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level from
regression according to equation 1.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Incentivized Outcomes across Treatments
Notes: Responses to incentivized belief questions on share of Germans agreeing with gender-related statements depicted at x-axis. Correct
values indicated by vertical lines. No information: Respondent in experimental groups control group or salience. Information (pooled):
Respondent in experimental groups information or salience and information.
35
Figure 6: Distribution of Beliefs about the Norm on Shared Household Responsibility
Notes: Beliefs about the extent of the norm that men should take as much responsibility for the home and the children as women. Correct
values indicated by vertical lines. Sample: Respondents in experimental group salience and egalitarian information.
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Table 1: Treatment E ects on Labor-Supply Expectations
Self-expected labor supply Expected within-family gender gap
(1) (2)
Panel A: Girls
Treatments (pooled) -2.610⇤⇤⇤ (0.600) 2.240⇤⇤⇤ (0.766)
p-values: MHT Correction
Treatments (pooled) 0.000 0.006




Treatments (pooled) -1.814⇤⇤⇤ (0.650) -1.415 (0.980)
p-values: MHT Correction
Treatments (pooled) 0.004 0.162




Treatments (pooled) -2.187⇤⇤⇤ (0.445) 0.708 (0.608)




Notes: OLS regressions. Treatments (pooled): Respondent in experimental groups salience, information or
salience and information. Dependent variables: (1) Hours expected to work per week when having a child
1-6 (0=0 hours, i.e. not at all; 10= 10 hours; 20= 20 hours, i.e. part-time; 30=30 hours, 40=40 hours, i.e.
full-time); (2) Responses to labor supply for both parents (self and partner) with higher values indicating
higher labor market supply of men relative to women. Control mean: Mean of the outcome variable in the
control group. Covariates include: age, gender, born in Germany, living with parents, currently in school,
current school track leading to university entrance degree, mother working full-time, having siblings, West
Germany, living in large city, parents with university education, risk, patience, and imputation dummys.
MHT Correction refers to the multiple hypothesis testing procedure presented in List et al. (2019) and
corrects for two subgroups (girls and boys). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate
significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table 2: Separate Treatment E ects on Labor-Supply Expectations
Self-expected labor supply Expected within-family gender gap
(1) (2)
Panel A: Girls
Salience -1.965⇤⇤⇤ (0.731) 2.207⇤⇤ (0.924)
Information -2.582⇤⇤⇤ (0.774) 1.969⇤⇤ (0.970)




Salience & information 0.000 0.045




Salience -1.328 (0.823) -1.233 (1.283)
Information -1.578⇤ (0.872) -2.145⇤ (1.295)




Salience & information 0.014 0.407




Salience -1.534⇤⇤⇤ (0.555) 0.779 (0.756)
Information -2.132⇤⇤⇤ (0.581) 0.372 (0.785)




Salience & information 0.000 0.444




Notes: OLS regressions. Salience, Information and Salience & information indicate membership of
respective treatment groups. Dependent variables: (1) Hours expected to work per week when having a
child 1-6 (0=0 hours, i.e. not at all; 10= 10 hours; 20= 20 hours, i.e. part-time; 30=30 hours, 40=40
hours, i.e. full-time); (2) Responses to labor supply for both parents (self and partner) with higher values
indicating higher labor market supply of men relative to women. Control mean: Mean of the outcome
variable in the control group. See Table 1 for included covariates. MHT Correction refers to the multiple
hypothesis testing procedure presented in List et al. (2019) and corrects for two subgroups (girls and boys)
as well as multiple treatments in Panel B. Results from Wald tests, testing for equal coe cients reject
Salience=Salience & information in column (1) of Panel A (p<0.1) as well as column (1) of Panel C
(p<0.05). Equal coe cients within all remaining treatment/outcome/subgroup combinations cannot be
rejected. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Information provision (pooled) -1.673⇤⇤⇤ -1.673⇤⇤ -1.537⇤⇤
(0.493) (0.676) (0.702)
Information provision (pooled) x follow-up 0.553 0.641 0.438
(0.518) (0.691) (0.788)
Follow-up 0.447 0.503 0.378
(0.359) (0.465) (0.564)
Info provision in follow-up -1.120⇤⇤ -1.032 -1.098
Control mean 26.15 22.63 30.48
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Observations (respondents) 1319 734 585
R-squared 0.199 0.109 0.028
Notes: OLS regressions. Info provision: Respondent in experimental groups information
or salience and information. Dependent variable: Hours expected to work per week
when having a child 1-6 (0=0 hours, i.e. not at all; 10= 10 hours; 20= 20 hours,
i.e. part-time; 30=30 hours, 40=40 hours, i.e. full-time). Info provision in follow-up
is the linear combination of the coe cients on Info provision plus Info provision x
follow-up. Control mean: Mean of the outcome variable in the omitted group (i.e.
experimental groups control group or salience) reported in the main survey. See Table 1
for included covariates. Sample: Respondents who participated in the follow-up survey.
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the respondent level, in parentheses.
***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Salience & information -1.334⇤ -1.017 -1.297
(0.687) (1.241) (0.845)
Misperception x salience & information -0.046 -0.145 -0.020
(0.266) (0.403) (0.400)
Misperception 0.292 0.366 0.215
(0.219) (0.302) (0.303)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Observations 965 565 400
R-squared 0.197 0.116 0.045
Notes: OLS regressions. Salience & information: Respondents in respective
experimental group. Dependent variable: Hours expected to work per week
when having a child 1-6 (0=0 hours, i.e. not at all; 10= 10 hours; 20= 20 hours,
i.e. part-time; 30=30 hours, 40=40 hours, i.e. full-time). Misperception: Actual
share minus guessed share of German adult population holding the opinion
that parents (of respondent’s gender) should reduce their labor market supply
as long as the children are young, divided by 10. See Table 1 for included
covariates. Sample: Respondents in experimental groups salience and salience
and egalitarian information. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/*
indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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as working for pay.
Causes problems
if a woman earns more
than her husband.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Girls
Information provision (pooled) 0.457⇤⇤⇤ 0.173⇤⇤⇤ 0.095⇤⇤⇤ 0.225⇤⇤⇤
(0.085) (0.042) (0.024) (0.075)
p-values: MHT Correction
Information (pooled) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
Control mean 2.262 1.612 0.668 2.150
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1130 1156 1143 1137
R-squared 0.041 0.053 0.046 0.024
Panel B: Boys
Information provision (pooled) 0.607⇤⇤⇤ 0.215⇤⇤⇤ 0.069⇤⇤ 0.337⇤⇤⇤
(0.102) (0.049) (0.029) (0.087)
p-values: MHT Correction
Information (pooled) 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000
Control mean 2.299 1.583 0.678 1.978
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 811 829 820 807
R-squared 0.069 0.059 0.057 0.040
Notes: OLS regressions. Info provision: Respondent in experimental groups information or salience and information. Dependent
variables: Beliefs about share of Germany agreeing with the statements that (1) a university education is more important for a boy
than for a girl relative to correct value (=16). (2) the children su er if the mothers works for pay relative to correct value (=33). (3)
being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay relative to correct value (=55). (4) it is almost certain to cause problems
if a woman earns more than her husband relative to correct value (=20). Results (not shown) from full interaction model between
gender and treatment indicators do not reveal any heterogeneous treatment e ects by gender. Control mean: Mean of the outcome
variable in the control group. See Table 1 for included covariates. MHT Correction refers to the multiple hypothesis testing procedure
presented in List et al. (2019) and corrects for multiple subgroups (girls and boys) and multiple outcomes (all 4 outcomes listed).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table 6: E ects of the More Egalitarian Norm on the Expected Within-Family Gender Gap
(Follow-Up Sample)
Expected within-family gender gap
(1) (2) (3)
All Girls Boys
Egalitarian treatments (pooled) -1.321⇤⇤⇤ -1.261⇤⇤⇤ -1.398⇤⇤
(0.351) (0.437) (0.571)
p-values: MHT Correction
Treatments (pooled) 0.007 1.000
Individual FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations (respondents) 1319 734 585
R-squared 0.010 0.011 0.009
Notes: OLS regressions. Egalitarian treatments (pooled): Respondent in experi-
mental groups egalitarian information or salience and egalitarian information.
Dependent variables: Responses to labor supply for both parents (self and
partner) with higher values indicating higher labor market supply of men relative
to women. Results (not shown) from interaction model between gender and
treatment indicator do not reveal any heterogeneous treatment e ects by gender.
Sample: Follow-up survey participants. Robust standard errors, adjusted for
clustering at the respondent level, in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance
at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Appendix A: Appendix Figures and Tables
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Figure A1: Gender Inequalities in Labor Supply across Countries
Panel A: Gender Gaps in Part-Time Employment across Countries
Panel B: Long-run Child Penalties across Countries
Notes: Panel A: Part-time employment rate as proportion of persons employed part-time among all employed persons, by gender. Part-time
employment is defined as people in employment (whether employees or self-employed) who usually work less than 30 hours per week in
their main job. Data source: OECD, 2018; Panel B: Long-run child penalties. Data source: Kleven et al. (2019).
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Figure A2: Norm about Maternal Labor Supply across Countries
Notes: Response to the question "Do you think women should work outside the home full-time, part-time or not at all under the following
circumstances? ...When there is a child under school age." Weighted means. Data source: International Social Survey Program (ISSP) in
2012.
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Figure A3: Screenshots on Norm Treatments
Panel A: Belief Elicitation about Norm Prescribing Parental Labor Supply
Panel B: Information about Norm Prescribing Parental Labor Supply
Notes: Panel A: Screenshot on the belief elicitation questions in treatment salience. Panel B: Screenshot on the information provision
in treatment information. Respondents in treatment salience & information first receive the belief elicitation question (panel A) and
afterwards accurate information (panel B).
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Figure A4: Screenshots on More Egalitarian Norm Treatments in Follow-Up Survey
Panel A: Belief Elicitation about Norm on Shared Household
Responsibility
Panel B: Information about Norm on Shared Household Responsibility
Notes: Respondents in treatment salience and egalitarian information first receive the belief elicitation question (panel A) and afterwards
accurate information (panel B). Respondents in treatment egalitarian information are provided with accurate information (panel B).
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Figure A5: Distribution of Beliefs about Norm Prescribing Parental Labor Supply in Follow-Up Survey
Panel A: Norm that Mothers Should Reduce their Labor Supply when Children Are Young
Panel B: Norm that Fathers Should Reduce their Labor Supply when Children Are Young
Notes: Beliefs about the extent of the norm that parents should reduce their labor market supply when children are young elicited in the
follow-up survey. Correct values indicated by vertical lines. Information (pooled): Respondents in experimental groups information or
Salience and information). Sample: Follow-up survey participants.
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Table A1: Comparison of Survey Sample Characteristics to Microcensus Data






Living in West Germany (excl. Berlin) 0.847 0.794
(0.009)
Attending Hauptschule/Realschule (low/middle track) 0.288 0.172
(0.008)
Attending school with several tracks 0.156 0.138
(0.008)
Attending Gymnasium (high track) 0.393 0.509
(0.011)
Living with both parents 0.761 0.723
(0.010)
At least one parent with uni degree [if living with both] 0.449 0.420
(0.013)
Mother does not work [if living with both] 0.233 0.173
(0.010)
Mother works full-time [if living with both] 0.207 0.405
(0.013)
Father works full-time [if living with both] 0.875 0.914
(0.008)
Observations 18501 2000
Notes: Column 1: Means based on Microcensus data from 2015. Column 2: Sample means and standard
errors (in parentheses) of our survey data. Data source: German population Microcensus 2015 and own
survey data.
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Table A2: Sociodemographic Characteristics across Treatments
Control
mean Salience Di . Information Di .
Salience &
information Di .
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female 0.559 0.603 0.043 0.607 0.048 0.563 0.004
Age 15.752 15.758 0.006 15.800 0.048 15.685 -0.067
Living in west Germany 0.796 0.778 -0.019 0.802 0.005 0.799 0.003
City size   100,000 0.681 0.698 0.016 0.697 0.016 0.687 0.006
Born in Germany 0.963 0.957 -0.006 0.973 0.010 0.976 0.013
Currently at school 0.893 0.922 0.030 0.922 0.030⇤ 0.911 0.019
Obtained degree/Current track leads to
No degree -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
Basic degree (Hauptschulabschluss) 0.049 0.049 -0.001 0.045 -0.005 0.040 -0.010
Middle school degree (Realschulabschluss) 0.284 0.239 -0.045 0.247 -0.037 0.305 0.021
University entrance degree (Fachabitur) 0.061 0.058 -0.003 0.096 0.035⇤⇤ 0.067 0.006
University entrance degree (Abitur) 0.606 0.654 0.049 0.611 0.005 0.589 -0.017
Living status
Living with both parents 0.715 0.732 0.017 0.671 -0.044 0.705 -0.010
Living with one parent 0.267 0.251 -0.016 0.292 0.026 0.272 0.005
Living without parents 0.019 0.017 -0.001 0.037 0.018⇤ 0.024 0.005
Having siblings 0.841 0.827 -0.014 0.849 0.008 0.797 -0.043⇤
At least one parent with university degree 0.369 0.413 0.044 0.389 0.020 0.386 0.017
Maternal employment status
Mother works full-time 0.419 0.426 0.008 0.423 0.005 0.437 0.018
Mother works part-time 0.367 0.357 -0.010 0.366 -0.001 0.362 -0.004
Mother housewife 0.031 0.026 -0.006 0.033 0.001 0.031 0.000
Paternal employment status
Father works full-time 0.809 0.814 0.005 0.838 0.029 0.852 0.043⇤
Father works part-time 0.041 0.043 0.002 0.033 -0.008 0.041 0.001
Risk tolerance (11-point scale) 5.674 5.616 -0.059 5.538 -0.136 5.500 -0.174
Patience (11-point scale) 6.461 6.341 -0.120 6.430 -0.031 6.421 -0.040
Observations 540 463 463 508
Notes: Group means. "Di ." displays the di erence in means between the control group and respective treatment groups. Significance
levels of "Di ." from linear regressions of the background variables on the respective treatment indicators. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table A3: Participation in the Follow-Up Survey









Living in west Germany -0.022 (0.027)
City size   100,000 0.060⇤⇤ (0.024)
Born in Germany -0.068 (0.059)
Currently at school 0.086⇤ (0.047)
No degree 0.435⇤⇤⇤ (0.096)
Middle school degree (Realschulabschluss) 0.029 (0.055)
University entrance degree (Fachabitur) 0.073 (0.067)
University entrance degree (Abitur) 0.026 (0.056)
Living with one parent -0.034 (0.026)
Living without parents -0.090 (0.075)
Having siblings -0.044 (0.028)
At least one parent with uni degree -0.005 (0.023)
Mother works full-time 0.017 (0.023)
Father works full-time 0.058⇤ (0.031)
Risk tolerance (11-point scale) -0.006 (0.005)
Patience (11-point scale) -0.004 (0.005)
Observations 1901
R-squared 0.037
Notes: Dependent variable: Dummy variable coded one if respondent participated in the follow-up
survey. Salience/Information/Salience & information indicate membership of respective treatment
group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%
level.
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Table A4: Sociodemographic Characteristics across the Treatments
(Follow-up Sample)
Control
mean Salience Di . Information Di .
Salience &
information Di .
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female 0.535 0.570 0.035 0.581 0.046 0.544 0.009
Age 15.623 15.694 0.071 15.714 0.091 15.558 -0.065
Living in west Germany 0.789 0.769 -0.021 0.797 0.007 0.803 0.013
City size   100,000 0.690 0.717 0.027 0.733 0.043 0.704 0.014
Born in Germany 0.956 0.958 0.002 0.968 0.012 0.972 0.016
Currently at school 0.918 0.922 0.004 0.949 0.031 0.935 0.017
Obtained degree/Current track leads to
No degree 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000
Basic degree (Hauptschulabschluss) 0.047 0.054 0.007 0.039 -0.007 0.030 -0.017
Middle school degree (Realschulabschluss) 0.298 0.246 -0.052 0.241 -0.057 0.290 -0.008
University entrance degree (Fachabitur) 0.068 0.074 0.006 0.085 0.016 0.069 0.001
University entrance degree (Abitur) 0.587 0.626 0.039 0.632 0.045 0.611 0.024
Living status
Living with both parents 0.713 0.746 0.032 0.698 -0.015 0.713 -0.001
Living with one parent 0.263 0.238 -0.025 0.279 0.016 0.268 0.004
Living without parents 0.023 0.016 -0.007 0.022 -0.001 0.020 -0.004
Having siblings 0.822 0.810 -0.011 0.857 0.036 0.772 -0.050
At least one parent with university degree 0.383 0.404 0.021 0.410 0.026 0.386 0.003
Maternal employment status
Mother works full-time 0.421 0.453 0.032 0.410 -0.012 0.451 0.030
Mother works part-time 0.380 0.332 -0.048 0.397 0.017 0.366 -0.014
Mother housewife 0.035 0.026 -0.009 0.025 -0.010 0.039 0.004
Paternal employment status
Father works full-time 0.815 0.840 0.025 0.834 0.019 0.868 0.052⇤
Father works part-time 0.038 0.036 -0.002 0.038 0.000 0.037 -0.002
Risk tolerance (11-point scale) 5.611 5.518 -0.093 5.479 -0.132 5.456 -0.155
Patience (11-point scale) 6.322 6.267 -0.055 6.404 0.083 6.439 0.118
Observations 342 307 315 355
Notes: Group means. "Di ." displays the di erence in means between the control group and respective treatment groups. Significance
levels of "Di ." from linear regressions of the background variables on the respective treatment indicators. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Sample: Follow-up survey participants. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female 0.552 0.557 0.005 0.567 0.015
Age 15.624 15.675 0.051 15.652 0.028
Living in west Germany 0.794 0.787 -0.007 0.785 -0.008
City size   100,000 0.716 0.689 -0.027 0.726 0.010
Born in Germany 0.963 0.970 0.007 0.956 -0.008
Currently at school 0.922 0.932 0.009 0.952 0.029⇤
Obtained degree/Current track leads to
No degree -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004
Basic degree (Hauptschulabschluss) 0.041 0.037 -0.004 0.050 0.009
Middle school degree (Realschulabschluss) 0.278 0.269 -0.009 0.251 -0.027
University entrance degree (Fachabitur) 0.071 0.077 0.006 0.077 0.007
University entrance degree (Abitur) 0.610 0.617 0.007 0.618 0.008
Living status
Living with both parents 0.719 0.727 0.008 0.700 -0.019
Living with one parent 0.261 0.249 -0.012 0.285 0.025
Living without parents 0.020 0.025 0.004 0.015 -0.006
Having siblings 0.806 0.814 0.008 0.833 0.027
At least one parent with university degree 0.394 0.393 -0.000 0.400 0.006
Maternal employment status
Mother works full-time 0.452 0.418 -0.034 0.407 -0.045
Mother works part-time 0.357 0.410 0.053⇤ 0.344 -0.013
Mother housewife 0.026 0.041 0.015 0.033 0.007
Paternal employment status
Father works full-time 0.840 0.839 -0.001 0.840 -0.000
Father works part-time 0.040 0.038 -0.001 0.030 -0.010
Risk tolerance (11-point scale) 5.577 5.311 -0.265⇤ 5.641 0.064
Patience (11-point scale) 6.374 6.470 0.096 6.178 -0.196
Observations 683 366 270
Notes: Group means. "Di ." displays the di erence in means between the control group and respective treatment groups.
Significance levels of "Di ." from linear regressions of the background variables on the respective treatment indicators.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample: Follow-up survey participants. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table A6: Labor-Supply Expectations across Sociodemographic Characteristics







Female -7.293⇤⇤⇤ (0.748) -3.233⇤⇤⇤ (1.053)
Living in east Germany 3.698⇤⇤⇤ (0.910) -4.089⇤⇤⇤ (1.009)
City size   100,000 0.372 (0.894) -0.420 (1.175)
Aged 16 or 17 0.111 (0.830) -0.831 (1.072)
University entrance degree (Abitur) -0.030 (0.929) -4.615⇤⇤⇤ (1.189)
Mother works full-time 0.346 (0.807) -2.669⇤⇤⇤ (1.023)
Father works full-time -0.069 (1.033) 0.225 (1.250)
Having siblings -0.736 (1.139) 1.112 (1.235)
At least one parent with university degree -0.510 (0.821) -2.910⇤⇤⇤ (1.046)
Patience median or above 0.112 (0.819) 1.158 (1.051)
Risk median or above 0.557 (0.820) 0.187 (1.044)
Mean of the outcome 27.056 9.074
Observations 540 540
Notes: Bivariate OLS regressions, each column shows results from a di erent regression of the respective
outcome on the respective sociodemographic characteristic. Dependent variables: (1) Hours expected to
work per week with child 1-6 (0=0 hours, i.e. not at all; 10= 10 hours; 20= 20 hours, i.e. part-time; 30=30
hours, 40=40 hours, i.e. full-time). (2) Responses to labor supply for both parents (self and partner) with
higher values indicating higher labor market supply of men relative to women. Sample: Respondents in the
control group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%
level.
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Panel A: Combined treatment e ects
Treatments (pooled) -1.805⇤⇤⇤ -1.453
(0.658) (0.975)









Salience & information -2.366⇤⇤⇤ -1.210
(0.798) (1.201)
Salience x female -0.449 3.476⇤⇤
(1.120) (1.577)
Information x female -0.836 4.113⇤⇤
(1.165) (1.620)








Notes: OLS regressions. Panel A: Treatments (pooled): Respondent in experimental
groups salience, information or salience and information. Panel B: Salience, Informa-
tion and Salience & information indicate membership of respective treatment groups.
Dependent variables: (1) Hours expected to work per week when having a child 1-6
(0=0 hours, i.e. not at all; 10= 10 hours; 20= 20 hours, i.e. part-time; 30=30 hours,
40=40 hours, i.e. full-time); (2) Responses to labor supply for both parents (self
and partner) with higher values indicating higher labor market supply of men relative
to women. Control mean: Mean of the outcome variable in the control group. See
Table 1 for included covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/*
indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Salience -2.034⇤⇤⇤ -2.613⇤⇤⇤ -1.845⇤
(0.698) (0.954) (0.971)
Information -2.042⇤⇤⇤ -2.548⇤⇤⇤ -1.630⇤
(0.690) (0.964) (0.963)
Salience & information -3.157⇤⇤⇤ -3.323⇤⇤⇤ -2.981⇤⇤⇤
(0.648) (0.896) (0.920)
Salience x follow-up 2.490⇤⇤⇤ 2.258⇤⇤ 2.774⇤⇤
(0.714) (0.922) (1.137)
Information x follow-up 1.461⇤⇤ 1.694⇤ 1.108
(0.694) (0.958) (1.008)
Salience & information x follow-up 1.970⇤⇤⇤ 1.793⇤ 2.177⇤⇤
(0.731) (1.007) (1.072)
Follow-up -0.731 -0.601 -0.881
(0.482) (0.667) (0.704)
Salience in follow-up 0.456 -0.355 0.929
Information in follow-up -0.581 -0.854 -0.522
Salience & information in follow-up -1.187* -1.531 -0.804
Control mean 27.19 23.66 31.26
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Observations (respondents) 1319 734 585
R-squared 0.202 0.114 0.033
Notes: OLS regressions. Salience, Information and Salience & information indicate
membership of respective treatment groups. Dependent variable: Hours expected
to work per week when having a child 1-6 (0=0 hours, i.e. not at all; 10= 10 hours;
20= 20 hours, i.e. part-time; 30=30 hours, 40=40 hours, i.e. full-time). Salience
in follow-up/Information in follow-up/Salience & information in follow-up are the
linear combinations of the coe cients on the respective treatment indicators plus
respective treatment indicator x follow-up. Control mean: Mean of the outcome
variable in the omitted group (i.e. control group and treatment salience) reported
in the main survey. See Table 1 for included covariates. Sample: Follow-up survey
respondents. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the respondent
level, in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table A9: Persistence of Information Treatment E ects on Beliefs about Norms Prescribing Parental Labor Supply
(Follow-up Sample)
Relative belief
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Girls Boys All
Panel A: Social norm towards mothers elicited in follow-up
Information provision (pooled) 0.025⇤⇤ 0.034⇤⇤ 0.013 0.014
(0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)




Control mean 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1308 731 577 1308
R-squared 0.017 0.035 0.029 0.017
Panel B: Social norm towards fathers elicited in follow-up
Information provision (pooled) 0.058⇤⇤ 0.038 0.086⇤⇤ 0.085⇤⇤
(0.027) (0.037) (0.041) (0.040)




Control mean 0.87 0.91 0.82 0.87
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1296 728 568 1296
R-squared 0.040 0.045 0.048 0.040
Notes: OLS regressions. Info provision: Respondent in the experimental groups information
or salience and information. Dependent variables: Panel A: Belief about social norm towards
mothers relative to correct value (=91). Panel B: Belief about social norm towards fathers
relative to correct value (=41). Control mean: Mean of the outcome variable in the omitted
group (i.e. control group and belief elicitation only). See Table 1 for included covariates.
Sample: Follow-up survey respondents. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/*
indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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as working for pay.
Causes problems
if a woman earns more
than her husband.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Girls
Salience 0.016 -0.014 -0.011 0.013
(0.117) (0.058) (0.034) (0.107)
Information 0.437⇤⇤⇤ 0.104⇤ 0.086⇤⇤ 0.176⇤
(0.117) (0.058) (0.034) (0.105)
Salience & information 0.494⇤⇤⇤ 0.231⇤⇤⇤ 0.095⇤⇤⇤ 0.288⇤⇤⇤
(0.118) (0.058) (0.034) (0.107)
p-values: MHT Correction
Salience 0.989 0.999 1.000 0.900
Information 0.000 0.634 0.134 0.664
Salience & information 0.000 0.000 0.072 0.126
Control mean 2.266 1.629 0.679 2.154
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1130 1156 1143 1137
R-squared 0.041 0.057 0.046 0.025
Panel B: Boys
Salience -0.097 -0.107 -0.007 -0.140
(0.138) (0.068) (0.042) (0.124)
Information 0.412⇤⇤⇤ 0.091 0.043 0.161
(0.146) (0.070) (0.042) (0.125)
Salience & information 0.691⇤⇤⇤ 0.233⇤⇤⇤ 0.086⇤⇤ 0.369⇤⇤⇤
(0.138) (0.066) (0.039) (0.118)
p-values: MHT Correction
Salience 0.973 0.709 0.999 0.886
Information 0.069 0.843 0.911 0.856
Salience & information 0.000 0.013 0.299 0.014
Control mean 2.329 1.634 0.683 2.040
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 811 829 820 807
R-squared 0.073 0.066 0.059 0.045
Notes: OLS regressions. Salience, Information and Salience & information indicate membership of respective treatment groups.
Dependent variables: Beliefs about share of Germans agreeing with the statements that (1) a university education is more
important for a boy than for a girl relative to correct value (=16). (2) the children su er if the mothers works for pay relative
to correct value (=33). (3) being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay relative to correct value (=55). (4) it is
almost certain to cause problems if a woman earns more than her husband relative to correct value (=20). Results (not shown)
from full interaction model between gender and treatment indicator reveals significant heterogeneous treatment e ects by gender.
Control mean: Mean of the outcome variable in the control group. See Table 1 for included covariates. MHT Correction refers to
the multiple hypothesis testing procedure presented in List et al. (2019) and corrects for multiple subgroups (girls and boys),
multiple treatments as well as multiple outcomes (all 4 outcomes listed). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate
significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table A11: Treatment E ects on Labor-Supply Expectations Without Child
Self-expected labor supply Expected within-family gender gap
(1) (2)
Panel A: Girls
Treatments (pooled) -0.468 0.267
(0.531) (0.360)
p-values: MHT Correction
Treatments (pooled) 0.375 0.714




Treatments (pooled) 0.538 -0.391
(0.581) (0.631)
p-values: MHT Correction
Treatments (pooled) 0.590 0.539




Treatments (pooled) 0.002 0.050
(0.391) (0.340)




Notes: OLS regressions. Treatments (pooled): Respondent in experimental groups salience, information
or salience and information. Dependent variables: (1) Hours expected to work per week without child
(0=0 hours, i.e. not at all; 10= 10 hours; 20= 20 hours, i.e. part-time; 30=30 hours, 40=40 hours, i.e.
full-time); (2) Responses to labor supply without child for both spouses (self and partner) with higher
values indicating higher labor market supply of men relative to women. Control mean: Mean of the
outcome variable in the control group. See Table 1 for included covariates. MHT Correction refers to the
multiple hypothesis testing procedure presented in List et al. (2019) and corrects for two subgroups (girls
and boys). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%
level.
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Table A12: Separate Treatment E ects of the More Egalitarian Norm on the Expected Within-Family Gender Gap
(Follow-Up Sample)
Expected within-family gender gap
(1) (2) (3)
All Girls Boys
Egalitarian information -1.066⇤⇤ -1.078⇤ -1.049⇤
(0.426) (0.584) (0.622)
Salience & egalitarian information -1.667⇤⇤⇤ -1.503⇤⇤ -1.880⇤
(0.590) (0.660) (1.055)
p-values: MHT Correction
Egalitarian information 0.013 0.066 1.000
Salience & egalitarian information 0.009 0.063 1.000
Individual FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations (respondents) 1319 734 585
R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.010
Notes: OLS regressions. Egalitarian information and Salience & egalitarian information
indicate membership of respective treatment groups. Dependent variable: Responses
to labor supply for both parents (self and partner) with higher values indicating
higher labor market supply of men relative to women. Results (not shown) from
interaction model between gender and treatment indicator does not reveals significant
heterogeneous treatment e ects by gender. Robust standard errors, adjusted for
clustering at the respondent level, in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at
the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Online Appendix O1: Additional Results
O1.1. Results from the ifo Education Survey 2018
The experiment presented in the main part of the paper is an extended version of a previous
experiment that was conducted with 1,085 adolescents within the scope of the ifo Education
Survey 2018.38 The main purpose of the ifo Education Survey was to inform the German
policy debate about the opinion of adolescents on education-policy topics that are unrelated to
social norms or labor-supply expectations. At the end of the questionnaire (which encompassed
a total of 30 questions on education policy), we ran a similar but substantially shortened
version of the experiment on the social norm prescribing parental labor supply. Particularly,
the experiment randomized respondents into one of two experimental groups (the control
group and treatment salience and information), and then elicited labor-supply expectations.
Online Appendix Table O4 presents the results. Treatment e ects in this alternative sample are
remarkably similar to—and statistically indistinguishable from—those in our main sample (see
Table 2 for comparison). Given the importance of replication for the credibility of scientific
findings (e.g., Maniadis et al., 2014), it is also reassuring that our treatment e ects replicate
in two independent samples.
O1.2. Perceived Peer Pressure as Potential Mechanism
A potential complementary mechanism through which the gender norm alters labor-market
expectations is perceived peer pressure: Individuals may adhere to the social norm to meet
their peer groups expectations, and thereby avoid peer punishment of non-conform behavior
(e.g., Benabou and Tirole, 2011).39
To study the empirical relevance of this channel, we elicited respondents’ beliefs about
whether the following groups think that mothers and fathers, respectively, should reduce their
labor supply when the children are young: (i) family, (ii) friends, and (iii) the (future) partner.
For the analysis we combine these items into a z-standardized index measuring peer-group
expectations (Kling et al., 2007). To gauge the relevance of these di erent peer groups for
individual respondents, we additionally asked them how important it is for them to meet
38The ifo Education Survey is an annual opinion survey on education policy among representative samples
of adults in Germany (see https://www.ifo.de/en/survey/ifo-education-survey). In the 2018 wave, the general-
population sample was complemented by a sample of adolescents that was surveyed about education topics
(see Woessmann et al., 2018). The sampling and polling was done by the polling firm Kantar Public, which
drew respondents from a di erent subject pool than the one used for our main study.
39There are at least two further potential reason for why individuals follow norms, namely (i) because they
derive direct utility from actions that maintain their identity-based self-concepts (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton,
2000) and (ii) because of "best-practice considerations" in the sense that respondents may think that norms
entail meaningful information on how to achieve certain outcomes most e ectively (e.g., Cialdini and Goldstein,
2004; Cialdini and Trost, 1998). Focusing on child development and family income as two such outcomes, we
find no evidence that the latter channel is relevant in our setting (results available upon request).
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the expectations of each of these four groups (Online Appendix O3 presents the question
wording).40
Treated girls, but not boys are more likely to believe that their peers expect mothers to
reduce their labor supply. In columns 1 and 2 of Online Appendix Table O5, we regress the
indices of respondents’ beliefs about their peer groups’ norms towards mothers and fathers,
respectively, on the pooled treatment indicator. The treatments increase girls’ beliefs that
their peer groups demand that mothers reduce their labor supply by 15 percent of a standard
deviation, but do not a ect their corresponding beliefs regarding fathers. For boys, we find no
significant pooled treatment e ects.
Next, we study the connection between the importance that adolescents assign to their
peer groups’ opinions and labor-supply expectations. Online Appendix Table O6 regresses girls’
and boys’ self-expected labor supply on the pooled treatment indicator and its interaction with
the importance respondents assign to their peer groups’ expectations.41 The coe cient on
the interaction term reveals that treatment e ects for girls (but not for boys) are stronger the
more important they consider peer expectations.
Put together, these two sets of results suggest that treatment e ects for girls may in fact
be driven by their desire to adhere to their peer groups’ norms. The peer-pressure channel
seems to be less relevant for boys.
O1.3. Importance of Di erent Job Attributes
To investigate whether the traditional norm a ects further labor-market-related preferences
that are only indirectly linked to labor supply as young parents, we also study treatment
e ects on adolescents’ preferences for future job attributes. For that purpose, respondents
rated the following eight di erent job attributes on a five-point scale from "very important"
to "very unimportant": "The job . . . " (i) ". . . can be reconciled with children.", (ii) ". . .
enables part-time employment.", (iii) ". . . o ers a high salary.", (iv) ". . . o ers good career
opportunities.”, (v) ". . . o ers job security.", (vi) ". . . is challenging.", (vii) ". . . gives me
enough leisure time", (viii) ". . . is enjoyable." (see Online Appendix O3 for exact wording). In
the control group, female respondents consider reconciliation with children and the possibility
to work part-time more important than males (see Online Appendix Table O7), which is in
line with Wiswall and Zafar (2018)’s finding on higher willingness to pay for work flexibility
among females. Regressing the importance of job attributes on the pooled treatments reveals
that the social norm decreases the importance that females assign to the reconciliation of
job and children.42 While we would expect the treatments to increase and not decrease the
40Beliefs about the peer groups’ views as well as the groups’ importance were elicited after treatment
administration. We do not find any treatment e ects on stated importance of the di erent peer groups (results
available upon request).
41In the regressions, we again computed an index of the importance assigned to the di erent peer groups
using the procedure by Kling et al. (2007).
42For the regressions, we z-standardized the five-point scale outcomes.
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importance of this factor if it makes girls more likely to expect working part-time, it can be
rationalized by the fact that females downward-adjust their fertility expectations in response to
the treatment, which in turn makes reconciliation of work and children less important (results
available upon request). The regression results in Online Appendix Table O7 suggest that
social-norm considerations have limited overall e ects on labor-market preferences.
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Online Appendix O2: Figures and Tables
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Table O1: Treatment E ects on Labor-Supply Expectations among Girls: All Answer Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0 hours 10 hours 20 hours 30 hours 40 hours
Panel A: Self-expected labor supply
Treatments (pooled) 0.034⇤⇤⇤ 0.042⇤⇤⇤ 0.035⇤⇤⇤ -0.068⇤⇤⇤ -0.042⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010)
Salience 0.026⇤⇤⇤ 0.032⇤⇤⇤ 0.027⇤⇤⇤ -0.052⇤⇤⇤ -0.032⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.019) (0.012)
Information 0.032⇤⇤⇤ 0.040⇤⇤⇤ 0.033⇤⇤⇤ -0.065⇤⇤⇤ -0.041⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.019) (0.012)
Salience & information 0.042⇤⇤⇤ 0.052⇤⇤⇤ 0.043⇤⇤⇤ -0.085⇤⇤⇤ -0.053⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.013)
Control mean 0.04 0.07 0.49 0.29 0.12
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1164 1164 1164 1164 1164
Panel B: Expected labor supply for partner
Treatments (pooled) 0.001 0.003 0.011 0.005 -0.019
(0.002) (0.004) (0.015) (0.006) (0.028)
Salience -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 0.010
(0.002) (0.005) (0.019) (0.008) (0.034)
Information 0.002 0.004 0.014 0.006 -0.026
(0.002) (0.005) (0.018) (0.008) (0.034)
Salience & information 0.003 0.006 0.022 0.009 -0.040
(0.002) (0.005) (0.019) (0.008) (0.034)
Control mean 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.40 0.39
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1164 1164 1164 1164 1164
Notes: Results from an ordered probit model. The table reports the average marginal
treatment e ects. Treatment (pooled): Respondents in experimental groups salience,
information and salience and information. Dependent variable is the answer to the question:
"Imagine you are 30 years old and you have a child aged between 1 and 6 years with your
partner. What do you think, how many hours per week on average would you like to work in
order to earn money?" (panel A) or "And how many hours per week on average would you
like your partner to work in order to earn money?" (panel B). Control mean: Mean of the
outcome variable in the control group. See Table 1 for included covariates. Sample: Girls.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%
level.
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Table O2: Treatment E ects on Labor-Supply Expectations among Boys: All Answer Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0 hours 10 hours 20 hours 30 hours 40 hours
Panel A: Self-expected labor supply
Treatments (pooled) 0.008⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤ 0.053⇤⇤⇤ 0.005 -0.081⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.005) (0.019) (0.004) (0.028)
Salience 0.006 0.010 0.040⇤ 0.004 -0.060⇤
(0.004) (0.006) (0.024) (0.004) (0.036)
Information 0.007⇤ 0.011⇤ 0.043⇤ 0.004 -0.066⇤
(0.004) (0.006) (0.024) (0.004) (0.036)
Salience & information 0.012⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤⇤ 0.072⇤⇤⇤ 0.007 -0.109⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.007) (0.023) (0.005) (0.034)
Control mean 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.45 0.35
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 836 836 836 836 836
Panel B: Expected labor supply for partner
Treatments (pooled) 0.007 0.006 0.000 -0.008 -0.006
(0.014) (0.013) (0.001) (0.016) (0.012)
Salience 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(0.018) (0.016) (0.001) (0.020) (0.015)
Information -0.010 -0.009 -0.001 0.011 0.008
(0.018) (0.016) (0.001) (0.020) (0.015)
Salience & information 0.027 0.023 0.002 -0.030 -0.022
(0.017) (0.015) (0.002) (0.019) (0.014)
Control mean 0.11 0.17 0.39 0.23 0.09
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 836 836 836 836 836
Notes: Results from an ordered probit model. The table reports the average marginal
treatment e ects. Treatment (pooled): Respondents in experimental groups salience,
information and salience and information. Dependent variable is the answer to the question:
"Imagine you are 30 years old and you have a child aged between 1 and 6 years with your
partner. What do you think, how many hours per week on average would you like to
work in order to earn money?" (panel A) or "And how many hours per week on average
would you like your partner to work in order to earn money?" (panel B). Control mean:
Mean of the outcome variable in the control group. See Table 1 for included covariates.
Sample: Boys. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at
the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Treatments (pooled) -2.108⇤⇤⇤ -2.425⇤⇤⇤ -1.769⇤⇤
(0.504) (0.683) (0.735)
Treatments (pooled) x living in east Germany -0.392 -0.952 -0.214
(1.057) (1.384) (1.552)
City size
Treatments (pooled) -1.301 -2.167⇤⇤ 0.080
(0.805) (1.067) (1.121)
Treatments (pooled) x city size   100,000 -1.295 -0.644 -2.803⇤⇤
(0.964) (1.292) (1.376)
Age
Treatments (pooled) -2.421⇤⇤⇤ -3.078⇤⇤⇤ -1.660
(0.708) (0.944) (1.019)
Treatments (pooled) x aged 16 or 17 0.402 0.801 -0.269
(0.909) (1.228) (1.319)
Educational attainment
Treatments (pooled) -2.771⇤⇤⇤ -2.830⇤⇤ -2.538⇤⇤
(0.855) (1.232) (1.144)
Treatments (pooled) x school to uni degree 0.684 0.068 1.115
(1.008) (1.419) (1.416)
Mothers’ employment
Treatments (pooled) -2.510⇤⇤⇤ -2.775⇤⇤⇤ -2.202⇤⇤
(0.595) (0.820) (0.858)
Treatments (pooled) x mother w. full-time 0.765 0.381 0.946
(0.889) (1.199) (1.303)
Parental education
Treatments (pooled) -2.774⇤⇤⇤ -2.924⇤⇤⇤ -2.445⇤⇤⇤
(0.561) (0.745) (0.829)
Treatments (pooled) x parents w. uni degree 1.562⇤ 0.899 1.546
(0.915) (1.267) (1.320)
Recruitment
Treatments (pooled) -1.518⇤⇤⇤ -1.583⇤⇤ -1.777⇤⇤
(0.540) (0.680) (0.883)
Treatments (pooled) x recruited via parents -1.654⇤ -2.796⇤⇤ -0.194
(0.939) (1.357) (1.308)
Notes: OLS regressions. Treatments (pooled): Respondent in experimental groups salience,
information or salience and information. Dependent variable: Hours expected to work per
week when having a child 1-6 (0=0 hours, i.e. not at all; 10= 10 hours; 20= 20 hours, i.e.
part-time; 30=30 hours, 40=40 hours, i.e. full-time). Living in east Germany/ city size
/ aged 16 or 17 / school to uni degree / mother w. full-time / parents w. uni degree /
recruited via parents: Respondent belongs to respective subgroup. See Table 1 for included
covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the
1%/5%/10% level.
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Notes: OLS regressions. Salience & information: Respondent in
respective treatment group. Dependent variable: Hours expected
to work per week when having a child 1-6 (0=0 hours, i.e. not
at all; 10= 10 hours; 20= 20 hours, i.e. part-time; 30=30
hours, 40=40 hours, i.e. full-time). Control mean: Mean of the
outcome variable in the control group. See Table 1 for included
covariates. MHT Correction refers to the multiple hypothesis
testing procedure presented in List et al. (2019) and corrects for
multiple subgroups (girls and boys) in Panel A and B. Sample:
2018 survey participants. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Treatments (pooled) 0.133⇤⇤ 0.042
(0.065) (0.063)
p-values: MHT Correction





Treatments (pooled) 0.032 -0.022
(0.073) (0.077)
p-values: MHT Correction




Notes: OLS regressions. Treatments (pooled): Respondent in experimental groups
salience, information or salience and information. Dependent variables: (1) Index
summarizing respondents’ belief about opinion of parents, friends and (future)
partner on appropriate labor market supply for mothers following the methodology
in Kling et al. (2007). (2) Index summarizing respondents’ belief about opinion
of parents, friends and (future) partner on appropriate labor market supply for
fathers following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007). Results (not shown) from
full interaction model between gender and treatment indicators do not reveal any
heterogeneous treatment e ects by gender. See Table 1 for included covariates.
MHT Correction refers to the multiple hypothesis testing procedure presented in
List et al. (2019) and corrects for multiple subgroups (girls and boys) and multiple
outcomes (all 2 outcomes listed). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/*
indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table O6: Heterogeneous Treatment E ects on Self-Expected Labor Supply




Treatments (pooled) -2.702⇤⇤⇤ -1.839⇤⇤⇤
(0.599) (0.653)
Treatments (pooled) x conformity index -1.170⇤ 0.555
(0.608) (0.687)





Notes: OLS regressions. Treatments (pooled): Respondent in experimental
groups salience, information or salience and information. Dependent Variable:
Hours expected to work per week when having a child 1-6 (0=0 hours, i.e. not at
all; 10= 10 hours; 20= 20 hours, i.e. part-time; 30=30 hours, 40=40 hours, i.e.
full-time). Conformity index: Index summarizing respondents’ stated importance
to conform to expectations of parents, friends and (future) partner following
the methodology in Kling et al. (2007). See Table 1 for included covariates.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the
1%/5%/10% level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Girls
Treatments (pooled) -0.152⇤⇤ -0.027 0.022 -0.011 0.003 -0.040 0.066 0.026
(0.066) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.058) (0.064) (0.059) (0.066)
p-values: MHT Correction
Treatments (pooled) 0.287 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.983 1.000
Control importance 0.83 0.72 0.91 0.83 0.96 0.91 0.96 0.74
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1164 1164 1163 1164 1164 1164 1164 1164
R-squared 0.040 0.033 0.022 0.068 0.030 0.023 0.021 0.038
Panel B: Boys
Treatments (pooled) -0.037 -0.031 0.037 0.055 -0.008 -0.012 0.013 -0.001
(0.078) (0.079) (0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.079) (0.073) (0.075)
p-values: MHT Correction
Treatments (pooled) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.993
Control importance 0.76 0.53 0.91 0.83 0.95 0.88 0.95 0.78
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 836 835 836 834 835 836 836 835
R-squared 0.031 0.031 0.020 0.043 0.031 0.029 0.024 0.042
Notes: OLS regressions. Treatments (pooled): Respondent in experimental groups salience, information or salience and information.
Dependent variables: (1)-(8) Respondents’ stated importance of respective job attribute on a 5 point-scale, standardized (the
higher the value, the more important the respective job preference). Results (not shown) from full interaction model between
gender and treatment indicators do not reveal any heterogeneous treatment e ects by gender. Control importance: Share of
respondents in the control group reporting respective job preference to be (very) important. See Table 1 for included covariates.
MHT Correction refers to the multiple hypothesis testing procedure presented in List et al. (2019) and corrects for multiple
subgroups (girls and boys) and multiple outcomes (all 8 outcomes listed). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/*
indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Online Appendix O3: Survey Items
Treatments
Salience
What do you think, how many adults in Germany hold the opinion that mothers and fathers,
respectively, should reduce their labor-market supply while the children are young? We do not
think of the first months after child birth, but the time thereafter. Now, imagine 100 adults
in Germany and indicate, what you think, how many adults agree with this statement. (’0’
means ’nobody’ and ’100’ means ’everybody’, with the numbers in between you can scale your
answer).
Answers : (i) XX adults hold the opinion that mothers should reduce their labor-market supply
while the children are young; (ii) XX adults hold the opinion that fathers should reduce their
labor-market supply while the children are young.
Information
Out of 100 adults in Germany, 91 hold the opinion that the mother should reduce her labor-
market supply while the children are young. At the same time, out of 100 adults in Germany,
41 hold the opinion that the father should reduce his labor-market supply while the children
are young.
Salience and Information
What do you think, how many adults in Germany hold the opinion that mothers and fathers,
respectively, should reduce their labor-market supply while the children are young? We do
not think of the first months after child birth, but the time thereafter. Now, imagine 100
adults in Germany and indicate, what you think, how many adults agree to this statement. (’0’
means ’nobody’ and ’100’ means ’everybody’, with the numbers in between you can scale your
answer).
Answers: XX adults hold the opinion that mothers should reduce their labor-market supply
while the children are young. XX adults hold the opinion that fathers should reduce their
labor-market supply while the children are young.
Out of 100 adults in Germany, 91 hold the opinion that the mother should reduce her labor-
market supply while the children are young. At the same time, out of 100 adults in Germany,




Out of 100 adults in Germany, 89 hold the opinion that men should take as much responsibility
for the home and the children as women.
Salience and Egalitarian Information
What do you think, how many adults in Germany agree with the following statement? Men
should take as much responsibility for the home and the children as women. Now, imagine 100
adults in Germany and indicate, what you think, how many adults agree to this statement. (’0’
means ’nobody’ and ’100’ means ’everybody’, with the numbers in between you can scale your
answer).
Answers : XX adults agree with following statement that men should take as much responsibility
for the home and the children as women.
Outcome Questions
Labor-Supply Expectations (with Child)
Imagine you are 30 years old and you have a child aged between 1 and 6 years. What do you
think, how many hours per week on average would you like to work in order to earn money?
Answers: 0 hours, i.e. not at all; about 10 hours, about 20 hours; about 30 hours; about 40
hours, i.e. full-time
And how many hours per week on average would you like your partner to work in order to earn
money?
Answers: 0 hours, i.e. not at all; about 10 hours, about 20 hours; about 30 hours; about 40
hours, i.e. full-time
Labor-Supply Expectations without Child
Now, imagine you are 30 years old, you live together with your partner and you have no children.
What do you think, how many hours per week on average would you like to work in order to
earn money?
Answers: 0 hours, i.e. not at all; about 10 hours, about 20 hours; about 30 hours; about 40
hours, i.e. full-time
And how many hours per week on average would you like your partner to work in order to earn
money?




Screen 1: On the next page, we will pose four guess questions. If your guesses to these
questions are accurate, you will receive an additional remuneration of 2 Euros. If you receive an
additional remuneration due to a correct guess, we will refund the amount in the course of the
next 4 weeks after the data have been analyzed. For further information click here. [If click:
After completion of the survey we will randomly select one of the four questions. If your guess
to this randomly selected question is accurate, you will receive the additional remuneration.
Your chances for the remuneration are highest if you give your best guess to all of the four
questions.
Screen 2: If your guesses to these questions are accurate, you will receive an additional
remuneration of 2 Euros. What do you think, how many adults in Germany agree with the
following statements? Image 100 adults in Germany and indicate, what you think, how many
adults hold this opinion (0 means nobody and 100 means all; with the numbers in between you
can scale your answers)
Answers: (i) XX of 100 adults hold the opinion that a university education is more important
for a boy than for a girl; (ii) XX of 100 adults hold the opinion that when the mother works
for pay, the children su er; (iii) XX of 100 adults hold the opinion that being a housewife is
just as fulfilling as working for pay; (iv) XX of 100 adults hold the opinion that if a woman
earns more than her husband, it is almost certain to cause problems.
Perceived Peer Pressure
What do you think, which opinion do the following groups hold regarding the labor supply
of mothers and fathers, respectively? My parents hold the opinion that (i)... mothers whose
children are aged between 1 and 6 years hold should reduce their labor supply, (ii)... fathers
whose children are aged between 1 and 6 years old should reduce their labor supply; My friends
hold the opinion that (i)... mothers whose children are aged between 1 and 6 years old should
reduce their labor supply, (ii)... fathers whose children are aged between 1 and 6 years old
should reduce their labor supply; My (future) partner would hold the opinion that (i)... mothers
whose children are aged between 1 and 6 years old should reduce their labor supply, (ii)...
fathers whose children are aged between 1 and 6 years old should reduce their labor supply.
Answers: holds/hold in any case the opinion; holds/hold rather the opinion; holds/hold rather
not the opinion; holds/hold in no case the opinion; neither nor
Importance of Peer Group Opinion
How important is it to you to meet the expectations of the following groups? (i)... my family
(e.g., parents, siblings); (ii)... my friends: (iii)... my (future) partner; (iv)... the society in
general
Answers : very important; rather important; rather unimportant; very unimportant; neither nor
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Preferences for Job Attributes
Now, we turn to the job that you would like to work for later on. For the choice of job,
di erent things can play a role. How important are the following things for you? [Order of
items randomized] (i) The job can be reconciled with children; (ii) The job enables part-time
employment; (iii) The job o ers a high salary; (iv) The job o ers good career opportunities;
(v) The job o ers job security (no unemployment); (vi) The job is challenging; (vii) The job
gives me enough leisure time; (viii) The job is enjoyable.
Answers : very important; rather important, rather unimportant; very unimportant; neither nor
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